剩余索取权、母子公司协同型配置模式与公司价值

Residual Claim Rights, Parent-Subsidiary Synergy Allocation Model and Company Value

母子公司权力配置是企业集团管理控制中的难题和关键问题。本文基于租值耗散理论,从剩余索取权的视角论证了母子公司协同型配置模式的选择机理及对公司价值的影响,并运用2007—2019年我国上市公司数据进行了实证检验。研究结果表明:母公司剩余索取权不利于母子公司协同型配置模式的选择,而其他大股东、子公司的剩余索取权及独立董事能够有效促进母公司选择该模式,并能够显著提升公司价值。进一步分析发现,母公司的绝对控股和国企性质抑制了其他大股东和子公司的剩余索取权对协同型配置模式的促进作用,而该模式在制度发展水平相对较低的地区能够对公司价值产生更加积极的影响。研究机理表明,母子公司协同型配置模式能够改善投资效率、提升公司价值。本文拓展了租值耗散理论在集团决策权配置中的应用机理,对指导企业集团管理控制模式选择实践有着重要的意义。

The parent-subsidiary power allocation is a difficult and key issue in the management and control of enterprise groups. Based on the theory of rent dissipation, this paper demonstrates the selection mechanism of the parent-subsidiary synergy allocation model and its impact on the company’s value from the perspective of residual claim rights, and conducts an empirical test by using the data of listed companies from 2007 to 2019. The results show that the residual claim rights of the parent company are not conducive to the choice of the synergy allocation model. The residual claim rights of other large shareholders and subsidiaries as well as the seats of independent directors can effectively promote to select the mode. This model can significantly increase the value of the company. Further analysis finds that the absolute holding and the nature of state-owned enterprises of the parent company inhibited the promotion of company value by the residual claim rights of other major shareholders and subsidiaries, and the model have a positive impact on the company’s value in areas where the level of institutional development is relatively low. The mechanism discussion shows that the synergy allocation model can improve investment efficiency and promote the value. This article expands the application mechanism of rent dissipation theory in the selection of decision-making power allocation mode and makes important sense to guide the management control mode selection practice in business groups.