碳交易及政府补贴下回收质量不确定的闭环供应链定价决策

Pricing Decisions of Closed-loop Supply Chain with Uncertain Recycling Quality under Carbon Trading and Government Subsidy

在废旧产品回收质量不确定的前提下,考虑一个由制造商、零售商和消费者组成的闭环供应链系统,分别构建三种政策机制下的Stackelberg博弈模型并进行比较,理论上分析再制造质量门槛、碳交易价格和政府补贴对产品定价、回收、碳排放及利润的影响。研究表明:当制造商根据自身情况设置合适的再制造质量门槛时,制造商和零售商的回收价格、回收数量、利润以及供应链总碳排放量均可达到最优;碳交易与政府补贴双参与政策可以在供应链碳排放量得到有效降低的同时提高供应链利润,有效解决单一的碳交易政策和政府补贴政策带来的不足。

Under the premise of uncertain recycling quality of waste products,a closed-loop supply chain system composed of manufacturer,retailer and recycler is considered. Stackelberg game models under three policy mechanisms are constructed respectively and compared with each other. The effects of remanufacturing quality threshold,carbon trading price and government subsidies on product pricing,carbon emissions and profits are theoretically analyzed. The research result shows that when the manufacturer sets an appropriate remanufacturing quality threshold according to its own situation,the recovery price,recovery quantity,profit and carbon emissions of the supply chain of the manufacturer and retailer can all reach the optimal;The dual participation policy of carbon trading and government subsidies can effectively reduce the carbon emissions of the supply chain and increase the profits of the supply chain,wihch can effectively solve the shortcomings caused by the single carbon trading policy and government subsidies policy.