政府监管下煤炭企业绿色开采策略的演化博弈

Evolutionary game of coal enterprises’ green mining strategies under government supervision

为提高煤炭企业执行绿色开采技术的积极性,促使煤炭企业走上绿色开采的路径,首先建立煤炭企业A、煤炭企业B以及政府绿色开采监管策略的演化博弈模型,分析各均衡点所对应雅可比矩阵的特征值,探讨三方主体在动态博弈后的稳定策略。然后利用MATLAB数值仿真分析系统达到最优策略状态的影响因素,结果表明:当三方主体的初始意愿为中立时,机会主义收益、执行绿色开采技术成本、政府监管成本、政府奖惩有助于系统向最优策略状态演化;当三方主体的初始意愿较低时,执行绿色开采技术成本、政府奖惩有助于系统向最优策略状态演化;三方主体较高的初始意愿也会促使系统达到最优策略状态。最后为煤炭企业的绿色开采提出相关的建议对策。

In order to increase the enthusiasm of coal enterprises to implement green mining technology and encourage coal enterprises to embark on the path of green mining, firstly to establish an evolutionary game model of coal enterprise A,coal enterprise B and the government’s green mining supervision strategy, and to analyze the Jacobian matrix corresponding to each equilibrium point the characteristic value, to discuss the stable strategy of the tripartite after the dynamic game.Then the MATLAB numerical simulation is used to analyze the factors that influence the system to reach the optimal strategy state.The results show that when the initial willingness of the tripartite is neutral, the opportunistic benefits, the cost of implementing green mining technology, the cost of government supervision, and government rewards and punishments will help the system evolve to the optimal strategy state;when the initial willingness of the tripartite is low, the implementation of green mining technology cost, government rewards and punishments help the system evolve to the optimal strategy state;the higher initial willingness of the tripartite will also promote the system to reach the optimal strategic state.Finally, relevant suggestions and countermeasures are put forward for the green mining of coal enterprises.