地方政府环境竞争策略转换机制分析

An Analysis of the Transformation of Local Government Environmental Strategy

文本以2004-2018年我国227个地级城市数据为依据,在证实我国地方政府环境竞争存在"逐底"与"逐顶"策略分化的基础上,分析环保问责制度、地方官员晋升预期对地方政府环境策略选择的影响。结论表明:我国地方政府间的环境竞争策略依然以"逐底"竞争为主,但东、中、西部地区政府已经出现显著的环境策略分化,具体表现为西部省份依然"逐底"与东部省份渐次"逐顶"。而地方政府环境策略之所以从"逐底"向"逐顶"转移,是官员个体在晋升预期与晋升激励共同作用下的个体选择结果。环保问责等制度的实施,并未导致环境策略发生本质性转变,但能够提升政府"逐底"竞争时的环境规制基准水平。基于此,文本提出相关对策与建议。

Based on the data of 227 prefecture level cities in China from 2004 to 2018,and on the basis of confirming the differentiation of “bottom by bottom” and “top by top” strategies in China’s local government environmental competition,this paper analyzes the impact of environmental accountability system and promotion expectation of local officials on the choice of local government environmental strategies.The conclusion shows that the environmental competition strategy among local governments in China is still dominated by “bottom-by-bottom” competition,but there has been a significant differentiation of environmental strategies among governments in East,Middle and West China,which is embodied in the “bottom-by-bottom” in the West and the gradual “top-by-top” in the East.The reason why the local government’s environmental strategy shifts from “bottom by bottom” to “top by top” is actually the result of individual choice of officials under the constraints of individual characteristics,promotion expectation and promotion incentive.The implementation of environmental accountability and other systems does not lead to the essential change of environmental strategy,but can improve the benchmark level of environmental regulation when the government competes “bottom by bottom”.Finally,this paper puts forward relevant suggestions.