MEDAguard:基于逻辑加密的微电极点阵生物芯片知识产权保护方案

MEDAguard:A Logic Encryption Scheme for Micro-Electrode-Dot-Array Biochips IP Protection

在微电极点阵(Micro-Electrode-Dot-Array,MEDA)生物芯片外包生产的过程中,未受保护的芯片设计知识产权容易遭受盗窃或过度生产攻击.本文提出一种基于逻辑加密的微电极点阵生物芯片的知识产权保护方案,称为MEDAguard,该方案使用生化协议中的废液滴和输入液滴构成逻辑加密模块,实现对生化协议的锁定,从而保护生化协议在外包生产过程中不被窃取.针对破解密钥最常用的暴力攻击法,提出一种安全性评价指标,用于评估生成的生化试剂是否符合浓度标准.采用多组仿真实验模拟攻击者对MEDAguard实施暴力攻击,实验结果表明MEDAguard能够有效地抵抗暴力攻击.

In the process of outsourcing the production of micro-electrode-dot-array(MEDA)biochips,the unprotected IP(intellectual property)of the chip design is vulnerable to theft or overproduction attacks.This paper proposes a logic encryption-based IP protection scheme for micro-electrode-dot-array biochips,called MEDAguard,which uses waste droplets and input droplets from bioassay to form logic encryption modules to lock the bioassay,thereby protecting it from theft during the outsourcing process.In addition,a security evaluation metric is proposed to assess whether the generated biochemical reagents meet the concentration criteria for compliance against the brute-force attack method most commonly used to break the key.Finally,several simulations are used to simulate a brute-force attack on MEDAguard,and the results show that MEDAguard can effectively resist brute-force attacks.