货运停车各方参与主体决策行为演化博弈分析

Evolutionary game analysis on decision-making behaviors of participants in freight parking

为减少货运停车中不合理停车行为对交通系统带来的负面影响,采用演化博弈方法对政府管理部门、货运停车经营企业和货运司机的决策行为进行动态分析,并利用数值实验对演化博弈过程及结果进行仿真.结果表明,经营企业和货运司机的参与意愿均会对演化博弈的仿真结果造成影响.增强政府部门监管力度是治理货运司机停车不规范行为的有效方式.当监管力度不能发挥作用时,合理提高经营企业或货运司机的财政补贴亦是解决问题的有效途径.在收益增加的情况下,经营企业和货运司机可以通过增强自身的参与意愿来实现博弈主体各方的共赢.

To reduce the negative impact of the unreasonable parking behavior in freight parking on the transportation system,the decision-making behaviors of government management departments,freight parking operation enterprises and freight drivers were dynamically analyzed using evolutionary game methods,and numerical experiments were used to simulate the evolutionary game process and results.The results show that the willingness of the operating enterprises and freight drivers to participate has an impact on the simulation results of the evolutionary game.Strengthening the supervision of government departments is an effective way to control the bad parking behavior of freight drivers.A reasonable increase in financial subsidies for operating enterprises or freight drivers is also an effective way to solve the problem when the supervision is not effective.In the case of increased profits,operating companies and freight drivers can increase their willingness to participate to achieve a win-win situation for all parties in the evolutionary game.