多个大股东能驱动企业降低过度负债水平吗

Can Multiple Large Shareholders Drive Firms to Reduce Excess Leverage?

本文以结构性去杠杆为政策背景,选取2007-2019年中国A股上市公司为样本,研究了多个大股东能否驱动企业降低过度负债水平。研究发现,存在多个大股东的企业过度负债水平更低。作用机制检验发现,其他大股东通过监督和退出威胁发挥治理效应,降低了企业过度负债水平。具体地,其他大股东通过提升信息透明度的作用路径抑制了控股股东的自利动机,进而降低了企业的过度负债水平。进一步研究发现,完善的制度环境降低了其他大股东的监督成本,有利于其治理效应的发挥;并且其他大股东有助于缓解过度负债对企业价值的负面影响,提升了企业价值。

This paper takes structural deleveraging as the policy background and analyses whether multiple large shareholders can drive firm to reduce its excess leverage,using a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to2019.The results show that the firms with multiple large shareholders have lower excess leverage.It is found that other large shareholders exert governance effect through supervision and exit threat to reduce firm’s excess leverage.To be specific,other large shareholders restrain the self-interest behaviors of controlling shareholders by enhancing information transparency,thus reducing the excess leverage.Further research shows that the perfect institutional environment reduces the supervision cost of other large shareholders and is conducive to their governance effect.In addition,other large shareholders help to alleviate the negative impact of excess leverage on corporate value and improve corporate value.