融资约束下的并购:代理问题、谨慎投资还是传递信号?

Mergers and Acquisitions under Financial Constraints:Agency Problem,Cautious Investment or Signal Transmission?

本文采用2009—2015年中国A股上市公司并购事件作为研究样本,探讨面临融资约束企业进行并购的动因,并且在现有研究的代理理论、谨慎投资假说之外,提出了信号传递假设,以检验融资约束对企业并购后果的影响。研究发现,主并公司面临的融资约束程度越高,其短期并购绩效越好、长期并购绩效越差,说明融资约束下的企业并购更适合用信号传递理论来解释。进一步的研究发现,上述效应在非国有企业和以现金支付的并购事件中更加显著;信号的积极效应大概会持续14个月,之后逐渐减弱并在第29个月后呈现负面影响。本研究认为,应当深化金融体制改革,减少对民营企业的信息不对称和额外成本,从根本上解决企业的融资约束问题,才能为企业长期发展创造良好条件。

This paper uses the 2009-2015 China A-share listed company merger and acquisition(M&A)events as research samples to explore the motivations of mergers and acquisitions under financial constraints.In addition to Agency Theory and Caution Investment Hypothesis of the existing researches,this paper proposes a Signal Transmission Hypothesis to test the impact of financial constraints on the consequences of M&A.We find that the higher degree of financing constraints faced by an acquirer,the better short-term M&A performance and the worse long-term M&A performance it will have,indicating that the M&A events under financing constraints can be better explained by the Signal Transmission Theory.Further research finds that the above effects are more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises and cash-payment M&A events;the signal will have a positive effect for about 14 months and then the positive effect will gradually weaken until it becomes negative after the 29th month.This study believes that it is necessary to deepen the reform of the financial system and release private enterprises from information asymmetry and extra cost.Only by solving the financing constraints of enterprises can they be provided good conditions for long-term development.