薪酬、股权与晋升,哪种高管激励模式对科研组织衍生企业更有效?--来自我国上市公司的证据

Pay,Equity and Promotion,Which Is More Effective Incentive for Executives in Academic Spin-offs?--Evidence from Listed Companies in China

科研组织衍生企业(academic spin-offs)是科研组织将学术成果转化为生产力而创办的企业。近年来,我国的科研组织衍生企业与日俱增,但经营业绩并不理想。其中,公司治理机制特别是高管激励的有效性一直被认为是影响企业绩效的重要因素。本文以我国境内上市的94家科研组织衍生企业为样本,从不同实际控制人的视角,探讨薪酬激励、股权激励和晋升激励三种高管激励模式对企业综合绩效的影响。结果发现,实际控制人为母体科研组织的衍生企业,其高管激励模式与实际控制人为非母体科研组织的衍生企业显著不同;薪酬激励与晋升激励对科研组织衍生企业综合绩效有显著正向影响,而股权激励的作用不显著。

Establishing academic spin-offs is one of the important means to transfer scientific and technological achievements from academic organizations to industries.In recent years,academic spin-offs arise sharply in China,but their performance is not as satisfactory as expected.Since executive incentive mechanism is a proven key factor for firms’performance,this paper conducts an empirical study on the relationship between executive incentive modes and corporate comprehensive performance from the perspective of different actual controllers.Based on the samples of 94 academic spin-offs of listed companies in China,the study finds that executive incentive modes are not in common in spin-offs with different actual controllers.Moreover,data shows that pay incentive and promotion incentive have a positive effect on corporate comprehensive performance,while equity incentive does not.