期刊文献+

Network-Constrained Energy Consumption Game for Dynamic Pricing Markets 被引量:1

原文传递
导出
摘要 The electricity distribution network is experiencing a profound transformation with the concept of the smart grid,providing possibilities for selfish consumers to interact with the distribution system operator(DSO)and to maximize their individual energy consumption utilities.However,this profitseeking behavior among consumers may violate the network constraints,such as line flows,transformer capacity and bus voltage magnitude limits.Therefore,a network-constrained energy consumption(NCEC)game among active load aggregators(ALAs)is proposed to guarantee the safety of the distribution network.The temporal and spatial constraints of an ALA are both considered,which leads the formulated model to a generalized Nash equilibrium problem(GNEP).By resorting to a well-developed variational inequality(VI)theory,we study the existence of solutions to the NCEC game problem.Subsequently,a two-level distributed algorithm is proposed to find the variational equilibrium(VE),a fair and stable solution to the formulated game model.Finally,the effectiveness of the proposed game model and the efficiency of the distributed algorithm are tested on an IEEE-33 bus system.
出处 《CSEE Journal of Power and Energy Systems》 SCIE EI CSCD 2022年第2期548-558,共11页 中国电机工程学会电力与能源系统学报(英文)
基金 This work was supported in part by the Science and Technology Project of SGCC“Research on Morphologies and Pathways of Future Power System”。
  • 相关文献

同被引文献15

引证文献1

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部