政府补贴与企业全要素生产率——甄选效应和激励效应

Government Subsidies and Firms’ Total Factor Productivity:Selection Effect and Incentive Effect

企业作为经济发展的微观主体,对我国经济转型和高质量发展具有重要作用。本文利用2000—2008年中国工业企业数据库数据,以及Logit回归和PSM-DID基于甄选效应和激励效应研究政府补贴和企业全要素生产率两者之间的关系。研究结果表明,政府补贴对企业全要素生产率存在甄选效应和激励效应。甄选效应下,规模大、生产率水平低的企业更易获得政府补贴;激励效应下,激励进入效应下政府补贴对企业的全要素生产率提升起抑制作用,而激励退出效应下政府补贴对企业的全要素生产率提升起促进作用。分样本检验发现不同企业所有制及补贴强度的影响表现出较大差异性,通过对影响渠道的进一步分析发现,融资约束和管理性交易成本是政府补贴影响企业全要素生产率提升的重要渠道。

As the microcosmic body of economic development,firms play an important role in China’s economic transformation and high-quality development. This paper uses the database data of Chinese industrial firms from 2000 to 2008 to study the relationship between government subsidies and firms’ total factor productivity by using logit regression and PSM-DID based on selection effect and incentive effect. The results show that government subsidies have selection effect and incentive effect on firms’ total factor productivity. Under the selection effect,firms with large scale and low productivity can get government subsidies more easily. Based on the research of incentive effect,it is found that the government subsidies play a negative role in total factor productivity under the incentive entry effect,and the government subsidies promotes the total factor productivity under the incentive exit effect. It is found that the influence of different firm ownership and subsidy intensity shows great difference under sample testing. Besides,Financing constraints and transaction cost are important ways for government subsidies to affect the firms’ total factor productivity through further testing of influence channels.