电商平台资金约束下电商闭环供应链的回收决策研究

Recycling Decisions of E-commerce Closed-loop Supply Chain Undercapital Constraint of E-commerce Platform

考虑电商平台独自承担服务成本还是与再造商共同承担服务成本,同时考虑电商平台是否选择贷款策略解除资金约束,本文构建了资金约束下的电商闭环供应链博弈模型。通过对四种决策模型的决策进行分析,给出再造商分担回收服务成本的条件和电商平台选择贷款的条件。文章研究表明:当电商平台存在资金约束时,再造商分担电商平台部分服务成本的同时,也分割了电商平台的部分利润,但是这对双方来说是一种“双赢”的结果。当电商平台不选择贷款策略时,自有资金越多,对再造商越有利;但是当电商平台选择贷款策略时,自有资金越多,对电商平台越有利,对再造商不再产生影响。而且,自有资金越多,再造商分担回收服务成本的比例会减小,回收服务水平提升度会减小。同时开展再造商分担回收服务成本和电商平台向银行贷款两种策略,是解除资金约束的最优选择。

Considering whether the e-commerce platform alone bears the recycling service cost or shares the cost of recycling service cost with the remanufacturer, and taking into account whether the e-commerce platform chooses a loan strategy to lift the capital constraint or not, game models of e-commerce closed-loop supply chain under platform’s capital constraint are constructed. The corresponding optimal strategies are solved and analyzed, and the conditions for the remanufacturer to share the service costs and for the E-commerce platform to choose a loan strategy are given. The results show thatwhen the e-commerce platform has capital constraint, though the remanufacturer shares part of recycling service costs, alsosplits profit of the e-commerce platform, which can achieve a win-win situation for both parties. When the e-commerce platform does not choose a loan strategy, the more self-owned funds, the more beneficial the remanufacturer will be. But when the e-commerce platform chooses a loan strategy, the more self-owned funds, the more favorable to the e-commerce platform but the remanufacturer is no longer influenced. Moreover, as self-owned funds increases, the proportion of service costs shared by the remanufacturer will be reduced, and the degree of recycling service improvement will be reduced. It is the best choice for the e-commerce platform to induce the remanufacturer to share the recycling service costs and choose a loan strategy together to lift the capital constraint.