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回收宣传模式对废旧产品回收影响及协调机制研究 被引量:7

Studying on the Influence of Recycling Promotion Models on the Waste Products Recycling and Coordination Mechanism
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摘要 消费者对废旧产品环境影响认知是影响废旧产品回收的关键因素之一,而回收宣传可以有效提升消费者该认知。在进行回收宣传时,会产生一定回收宣传费用,该费用如何分摊直接影响上下游回收宣传力度。为分析回收宣传费用对不同回收模式影响,本文基于不同的回收宣传费用承担方式构建4种回收模式。基于这4种回收模式,首先,对比分析不同回收宣传模式对单位废旧产品委托回收价格、单位回收价格、回收量和收益影响,其次,运用收益共享-成本分摊契约实现上下游同时进行回收宣传时协调机制,使上下游收益达到最优。研究主要得到:分散决策时,当回收商与处理商回收宣传成本系数之差小于某一阈值时,由回收商负责回收宣传较好,反之,由处理商负责回收宣传较好;上下游同时进行回收宣传时,单位回收宣传努力程度、废旧产品回收数量和收益大于只有一方进行回收宣传时,也即,当上下游同时回收宣传时,由于回收宣传作用,废旧产品回收比其只有一方进行回收宣传更有效;集中决策时,单位废旧产品回收价格、回收数量和总收益都大于上下游同时进行回收宣传时,通过收益共享-成本分摊契约可以使上下游同时进行回收宣传模式达到整体最优。 The consumer awareness of the environmental is one of the key factors affecting waste product recycling, and recycling promotion could effectively enhance consumer awareness. However, there will be some recycling promotion cost in the process of recycling promotion, thus, how to allocate the cost directly affects the upstream and downstream publicity efforts of recycling.The game models(YD model is the cost of the recycling promotion by the processor;YR model is the cost of the recycling promotion by therecyclers;YG model is the cost of the recycling promotion by theprocessor and the recycler;C model is centralized decision model)between a processor and a recycler are constructed based on different recycling models in order to analyze the impact of different recycling models on the recycling of waste products. Basing on the game models, firstly, the impact of recycling promotion models on the unit waste product entrusted recycling price, the unit recycling price, recycling volume and profits is comparative analyzed;secondly, using the revenue sharing-cost sharing contract achieves the coordination mechanism of upstream and downstream simultaneous recycling promotion and make the profits reach the optimal. The main results are as follows: when it is decentralized decision, it is better for the recycler to be responsible for recycling promotion when the difference between the recycling cost coefficient of the recycler and the processor is less than a certain threshold, otherwise, the processor is better for recycling promotion;when the upstream and downstream carry out recycling promotion at the same time, the unit efforts of recycling promotion, the volume of recycled waste products and the profits are greater than when only one party carries out recycling promotion, that is, when upstream and downstream recycling promotion simultaneously, the recycling of waste products is more effective for one party to carry out recycling promotion;when it is centralized decision, the unit recycling price, volume and total profits are greater than the upstream and downstream simultaneous recycling promotion, however, through the revenue sharing-cost sharing contract could make the upstream and downstream recycling promotion model to achieve the optimal.
作者 赵强 夏西强 ZHAO Qiang;XIA Xi-qiang(Hust School of economics,Huazhong University of Science and Technology Wuhan,430074,China;Business School,Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou 450001,China)
出处 《中国管理科学》 CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2022年第3期258-268,共11页 Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金 国家自然科学基金资助青年项目(71702174) 教育部人文社会科学研究项目(21YJC630140) 河南省科技创新人才支持计划(21-CX-007)。
关键词 回收宣传 处理商 回收商 博弈论 recycling promotion processor recycler game theory
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