反垄断、竞争强度与高管激励

Antitrust,Competition Intensity and Executive Incentives

《反垄断法》作为匡正市场秩序的竞争政策,为市场竞争发挥外部公司治理作用提供了良好的制度环境。《反垄断法》实施后,市场竞争强度的变化对企业高管薪酬激励的有效性有着重要影响。本文以2006—2013年A股上市公司为研究对象,运用双重差分模型考察《反垄断法》对高管薪酬激励有效性的影响。结果表明:《反垄断法》实施后,与垄断势力低的企业相比,垄断势力高的企业高管薪酬业绩敏感性显著提高;进一步检验发现,《反垄断法》的实施降低了处理组企业的市场势力,提高了其会计信息质量;而且《反垄断法》对高管薪酬业绩敏感性的提升作用主要在非国有、机构投资者持股比例高、行业进入壁垒高的企业中显著存在;《反垄断法》的实施还改变了企业的货币薪酬水平和股权薪酬水平。

The implementation of the Anti-Monopoly Law,as a pro-competition policy to correct the market order,has an important impact on the effectiveness of executive compensation incentives.This paper uses the difference-in-differences method to examine the impact of the law on the executive pay-performance sensitivity.The results show that since the Anti-Monopoly Law was put into effect,the executive pay-performance sensitivity for monopoly companies has increased significantly than that in non-monopoly companies.Further study shows that the law has affected the executive pay-performance sensitivity through market power and earnings management.Moreover,the impact on the executive pay-performance sensitivity exists in non-state-owned enterprises,firms with a higher institutional shareholding ratio and firms in industries with a higher entry threshold.The Anti-Monopoly Law has also changed the executive compensation of monopoly enterprises.