摘要
基于行政授权的理论视角,提出一个中国政府间关系及其治理模式的分析框架,以此揭示中国政府“集权-分权悖论”治理特征形成的因果逻辑。在此框架下,作为政府分权治理的一种有效形式,行政授权程度及其模式的选择取决于政府组织内部委托方关于代理方“治理效率-治理风险”的动态权衡,进而决定了授权边界范围和具体内容中诸种剩余控制权的不同分配组合形态,由此塑造出相应的中国政府间关系及其治理模式。
This article attempts to propose an analysis framework of the relationship between the Chinese government and its governance model from the perspective of administrative authorization,in order to reveal the causal logic of the governance characteristics of the Chinese government’s“centralization-decentralization paradox”.Under this analytical framework,administrative authorization is regarded as an effective form of government decentralized governance.Whether it is authorized or the degree of authorization depends on the dynamic weighing of the agent’s“governance efficiency-governance risk”by the principal within the administrative organization.The choice of the degree of authorization and its mode determines the distribution and combination of the various remaining control rights in the boundary of the administrative authorization and the specific content,thereby shaping the corresponding relationship between the Chinese government and its governance model.
作者
张向达
祖俊涛
梁超
ZHANG Xiangda;ZU Juntao;LIANG Chao(School of Public Administration,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Dalian 116025,China)
出处
《中国软科学》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2022年第2期163-173,共11页
China Soft Science
基金
国家自然科学基金项目“贫困跨代干预复合架构的机理分析与政策系统设计”(71774017)。
关键词
行政授权
中国政府间关系
治理模式
贫困治理
administrative authorization
chinese intergovernmental relations
governance model
poverty governance