摘要
在考虑区块链对单位信息披露成本与平台用户需求函数的影响基础上,分别建立了垄断、竞争瓶颈和双寡头市场下平台信息披露的博弈决策模型,并进一步研究消费者信息认知程度对平台信息披露决策的影响。通过研究发现,垄断和竞争市场下,平台信息最优披露水平会随着信息敏感消费者比例增大而增大,随着单位信息披露成本降低而增加。竞争瓶颈和双寡头市场下平台信息最优披露水平均相同,平台最优利润会随着信息披露竞争程度加剧而降低时。当消费者对信息越敏感或消费者对信息认知水平越低时,平台采取区块链技术提高产品的信息披露水平会获取更多利润。
Based on the influence of blockchain on unit information disclosure cost and platform user’s demand function,the game decision-making models of platform information disclosure under monopoly is established,competition bottleneck and duopoly market respectively,and further studies the influence of consumer information cognition on platform information disclosure decision-making.It is found that the optimal information disclosure level of platform will increase with the increase of the proportion of information sensitive consumers,and increase with the reduction of unit information disclosure cost in monopoly and competitive markets.The optimal information disclosure level of platform in competitive bottleneck and duopoly market is the same,and the optimal profit of platform will decrease with the increase of information disclosure competition.When consumers are more sensitive to information or consumers’cognitive level of information is lower,platforms will gain more profits by adopting blockchain technology to improve the information disclosure level of products.
作者
桂云苗
胡红春
龚本刚
GUI Yun-miao;HU Hong-chun;GONG Ben-gang(School of Economics and Management,Anhui Polytechnic University,Wuhu 241000,Anhui,China;Staff Development Institute of China National Tobacco Corporation,Zhengzhou 450008,Henan,China)
出处
《山东大学学报(理学版)》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2022年第3期89-95,110,共8页
Journal of Shandong University(Natural Science)
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(72071002)
安徽省自然科学基金资助项目(2008085MG229)。
关键词
区块链
双边平台
信息披露
博弈模型
blockchain
two-sided platform
information disclosure
game model