摘要
现有研究普遍认为引致跨界污染的主要原因是边界地方政府放松环境规制,忽略了地方政府“以地谋发展”模式与跨界污染的内在联系。本文构建了一个包括临河县政府、省级政府与污染企业的理论模型,将中国特色的“以地谋发展”模式引入传统跨界污染模型,刻画了下游临河省界县地方政府通过土地出让政策引致跨界污染效应的微观机制。实证方面,本文选取位于中国20条主要跨省河流沿岸的省界县,结合中国土地出让微观数据与中国工业企业污染数据等,验证了理论假说。研究发现,具备跨界污染条件的下游临河省界县聚集了数量相对更多的水污染密集企业。并且,这些地区的土地出让面积越大,水污染密集企业数量越多。平均而言,具备跨界污染条件的地方政府每增加1%的土地出让面积,使得辖区内水污染密集企业数量增加6.09%左右。这一跨界污染效应仅存在于省界,在一省内部,即便市界县具备跨界污染条件,也未利用土地出让工具产生跨界污染后果。本文的研究补充了关于中国地方政府土地出让行为的研究,不仅为全面理解“以地谋发展”模式的经济社会后果提供了新视角,而且为推动中国土地政策改革和跨界污染治理提供了理论参考。
Existing studies tend to consider the relaxation of environmental regulations by border governments as the main cause of transboundary pollution, and rarely discuss the transboundary pollution consequences of landdriven development mode. This paper constructs a theoretical model that includes the county government, the provincial government and the polluting enterprises, and clarifies the theoretical mechanism that the local government of the downstream provincial border county produces transboundary pollution consequences by increasing the land supply. In the empirical analysis, this paper identifies the transboundary pollution consequences of landdriven development mode in border counties located along 20 major cross-provincial rivers in China, combining micro data on land concessions and industrial pollution data in China. The study finds that the downstream border counties gather a relatively larger number of pollution-intensive enterprises, and the larger the area of land concessions in these areas, the larger the number of water pollution-intensive enterprises. On average, each 1%increase in land concession area in these regions will result in an increase of about 6.09% in the number of water pollution-intensive enterprises. This paper further finds that the cross-border pollution effect exists only at provincial boundaries, and within a province, even if municipal counties have cross-border pollution conditions, they do not use land concession to generate transboundary pollution. This study complements the research on the land concession behavior of local governments in China and provides a new perspective for understanding the economic and social consequences of the land-driven development mode. At the same time, it also provides a useful reference for land policy reform and cross-border pollution control in China.
作者
金刚
沈坤荣
李剑
JIN Gang;SHEN Kun-rong;LI Jian(School of Business,Nanjing University,Nanjing 210093,China)
出处
《中国工业经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第3期95-113,共19页
China Industrial Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金青年科学基金项目“地方性环境治理政策的扩散机制与政策效应研究:以‘河长制’为例”(批准号71903085)
国家社会科学基金重大项目“我国高质量发展的能力基础、能力结构与推进机制”(批准号19ZDA049)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目“气候变化的经济效应:理论机理与中国证据”(批准号010414370114)。
关键词
地方政府
土地出让行为
跨界污染
环境规制
税收征管
local government
land transfer
transboundary pollution
environmental regulation
tax collection and supervision