限选条款设置中的股东角色与条款治理效果研究

Research on the Roles of Shareholders in the Setting of Restriction Provisions and the Effect of Restriction Provisions on Corporate Governance

根源于西方交错董事会制度的限制董事改选条款会对股东之间董事会控制权分配产生不容忽视的影响。本文基于2011—2019年沪深A股上市公司的数据,分析了第一大股东和其他大股东在限选条款设置中的角色,以及限选条款设置带来的公司治理效果。研究发现,当第一大股东控制权面临的内外部风险更大时,上市公司设置限选条款的可能性更大,说明限选条款成为第一大股东防御外部收购威胁、加强自身控制权的工具;而其他大股东却对由第一大股东主导设置的限选条款持反对态度,表现为当存在持股超过一定比例的其他大股东时,上市公司设置限选条款的可能性更小。从限选条款的公司治理效果看,限选条款能够有效保护第一大股东在股权层面和董事会层面的控制权,却加剧了股东之间董事会控制权分配不公,使得第一大股东成为董事会的主导。这为限选条款设置中的股东角色提供了解释。最终,限选条款使得第一大股东及其委派的董事“盘踞”在公司内部,引发董事超额薪酬和在职消费等代理问题,同时也不能改善公司绩效。拓展性研究发现,相较于限制换届改选,限制非换届改选的限选条款的防御意味更浓,防御效果更好,对第一大股东的“偏袒保护”也更明显。本文的研究为资本市场和监管当局规范上市公司的限选条款设置行为提供了参考。

Rooted in the Staggered Board System,restriction provisions will have a significant impact on the distribution of the control rights of the board of directors among shareholders.Based on the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2019,this paper analyzes the roles of the first largest shareholder and other major shareholders in the setting of restriction provisions,as well as the corporate governance effect brought by the setting of restriction provisions.The study finds that when the internal and external control risks faced by the largest shareholders are greater,listed companies are more likely to set up restriction provisions,which shows that restriction provisions have become a tool for the largest shareholder to defend against the threat of external takeover and strengthen its own control.However,other major shareholders are opposed to the restriction provisions set by the largest shareholder,which is reflected in that when there are other major shareholders holding more than a certain proportion,the listed company is less likely to set restriction provisions.From the perspective of corporate governance effect,the restriction provisions can effectively protect the control right of the first largest shareholder at the equity level and the board level,but aggravate the unfair distribution of the control right of the board of directors among shareholders,making the first largest shareholder become the dominant shareholder of the board of directors.This provides an explanation for the roles of shareholders in the setting of restriction provisions.Finally,the restriction provisions make the largest shareholder and its appointed directors“entrenched”in the company,causing agency problems such as directors’excess compensation and perk consumption.Meanwhile,the restriction provisions can not effectively improve the corporate performance.In the extended research,this paper finds that compared with provisions restricting the general election,the provisions restricting the non general election have stronger defense meaning,better defense effect,and more obvious“partial protection”for the largest shareholder.The conclusion of this paper brings policy enlightenment to the capital market and regulatory authorities to regulate the setting of restriction provisions of listed companies.