代码共享协议选择与机票定价两阶段博弈模型

Two-stage game model of code sharing agreement choosing and tickets’pricing

代码共享是航空公司之间一种普遍且有效的合作方式,本文首先应用辐条模型描述了乘客对航空公司的偏好,并对自由销售模式下代码共享协议的选择阶段与代码共享机票的定价阶段,提出了对应的两阶段博弈模型及其简便求解方法.其次,利用数值实例验证了所提模型与求解方法的可行性,并通过对比分析可得纳什均衡局势.研究表明:代码共享协议虽节约运营总成本,但抬高了平均机票价格,使得航空公司总利润增加,乘客福利减少;为了最大化社会总福利,政府应促进较优纳什均衡局势的实现;在新型冠状病毒肺炎疫情期间,政府可给予一定的成本补贴,或适当调整乘客的心理成本.因此,本文为优化代码共享协议选择与提升社会总福利提供了重要理论与方法支持.

The code sharing is the popular and effective cooperation of the airlines.First,this paper applies the spokes model to describe the different preferences of passengers for three airlines,and proposes the twostage game model and the simple method for the code sharing agreement choosing stage and the tickets’pricing stage under the free-sale model.Second,we use the numerical example to show the feasibility of the proposed models and method.By comparison and analysis,the Nash equilibrium situations of the two-stage game can be obtained.This study demonstrates:The code sharing agreement saves the total operating cost,but it raises the average airfare of the aviation market,so that the airlines’profits increase and the passengers’surpluses decrease;the government should promote the realization of better Nash equilibrium situation in order to maximize the total social welfare;to further improve the total social welfare during the period of Corona Virus Disease-19,the government could give the airlines some cost subsidies or adjust the passengers’psychological costs.Therefore,this paper provides significant theoretical and methodical supports to optimize the choices of the code sharing agreements and to improve the total social welfare in the aviation market.