伯纳德·威廉斯羞耻道德论的情感维度及其限度

The Emotional Dimensions and Limits of Bernard Williams’ Moral Theory of Shame

威廉斯认为他同时代的道德哲学家们对道德的理性主义假设是一种谬误,为此,他试图构建一种基于"羞耻"的情感主义伦理学。一方面,威廉斯深入考察了古希腊伦理思想中的羞耻文化,并与现代道德哲学中的"罪责"进行对比,尝试将道德的基础建立在"羞耻"这一人类普遍的道德情感之上。此外,他进一步将"羞耻"推广到公共生活领域,围绕社会正义以及人与人之间的互动状态这两个方面进行深入探讨,试图证明"羞耻"亦是公共道德的重要基础。但在现实生活中,人的情感往往非常复杂,"羞耻"与"罪责"两个概念所涵摄的话语空间并非像威廉斯所强调的那样泾渭分明;而完全排斥理性,羞耻的情感也很难单独成为道德稳固的基础。

Williams argues that his contemporaries’ rationalistic assumptions about morality are a fallacy,and for this reason,he attempts to construct an emotionalism ethics based on "shame".On the one hand,Williams examines the culture of shame in ancient Greek ethical thought and contrasts it with "guilt" in modern moral philosophy,trying to base morality on "shame as a universal human moral emotion.In addition,he further extends "shame" to the field of public life,exploring in depth the two aspects of social justice and the state of human interaction,trying to prove that "shame" is also an important foundation of public morality.However,in real life,human emotions are often very complex,and the discourse space covered by the concepts of "shame"and "guilt" is not as clear-cut as Williams emphasizes.And by completely rejecting reason,the emotion of shame can hardly be the basis of moral solidity alone.