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控制权分配与职业教育治理模式:政府职业教育治理行动的一个分析框架 被引量:2

Distribution of Control Power and Governance Model of Vocational Education: An Analytical Framework of Governmental Vocational Education Governance Action
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摘要 借鉴经济学的不完全契约理论,从职业教育政策过程角度,将政府组织内部的职业教育治理控制权分为四个维度:目标制定权、检查监督权、激励分配权、实际执行权。各种控制权在作为委托方的中央政府、作为承包方的地方政府、作为代理方的基层政府之间的不同分配方式形成四种理想类型的职业教育治理模式,即集权式、发包式、分权式、联邦式。将这四种职业教育治理模式作为政府职业教育治理行动的一个分析框架,中国职业教育治理的常态模式是发包式治理模式。并以高职百万扩招政策为例从静态和动态两方面解读我国的职业教育治理模式。 Drawing on the theory of incomplete contract in economics, from the perspective of the policy process of vocational education,the control of vocational education governance within government organizations is divided into four dimensions: the right to set goals, the right to inspect and supervise, the right to motivate distribution, and the right to implement it in practice. Various kinds of control in the central government as the principal, as the contractor’s local government, as the agent of the grass-roots government between the different distribution modes form four ideal types of vocational education governance model, namely, centralized, subcontracting, decentralized,federal. Taking these four vocational education governance models as an analytical framework for the government’s action on vocational education governance, this paper focuses on the normal mode of vocational education governance in China, that is, the mode of governance of subcontracted vocational education. Taking the policy of expanding enrollment by millions of higher vocational posts as an example, the mode of vocational education governance in China from both static and dynamic aspects is interpreted.
作者 李阳 Li Yang(Tianjin University,Tianjin 300350)
出处 《职业技术教育》 北大核心 2021年第31期34-39,共6页 Vocational and Technical Education
基金 教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目“职业教育专业建设与产业发展的谱系图研究”(20JZD055),主持人:潘海生。
关键词 控制权分配 职业教育 治理模式 发包式治理模式 政府行动 distribution of control power vocational education governance model subcontracting governance model governmental action
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