摘要
PPP项目因融资风险提前终止会给政府、社会资本、公众造成巨大损失.运用演化博弈理论,构建政府、社会资本、公众三方的演化博弈模型,确定当PPP项目面临融资风险时,影响各参与方决策的主要因素,并利用matlab对均衡点的稳定性进行仿真分析,最后结合PPP实践提出规避项目提前终止的建议。
Early termination of PPP projects due to financing risks will cause huge losses to the government,social capital and the public.Evolutionary game theory,this paper builds the government,the evolutionary game model of social capital and the public,to determine when the PPP project financing risks,the main factors influencing the participants decision-making,and by using the matlab simulation analysis was made on the stability of the equilibrium,finally suggest to evade the project early termination based on PPP practice.
作者
刘孟
周高平
LIU Meng;ZHOU Gao-ping(School of Economics and Management,Chongqing Jiaotong University,Chongqing 400074,China)
出处
《数学的实践与认识》
2022年第4期48-60,共13页
Mathematics in Practice and Theory
关键词
融资风险
规避
提前终止
演化博弈
financing risk
avoid
early termination
evolutionary game