政府如何激励创新?——基于委托—代理理论的研究

How Government Stimulate Innovation——Based on Principal-Agent Theory

本文分析了在研发结果不确定和信息不对称的情况下,政府如何最优地采用研发补贴和企业所得税税率优惠来激励创新并减少政府失灵问题。当企业类型可以被观测时,补贴通常不必要,且最优税率随企业研发成功率的提高而提高。引入不对称信息后,我们发现激励相容的最优税率将随企业研发成功率的提高而降低。我们通过数值模拟分析了不同因素对最优政策的影响,表明信息不对称降低了政府和所有企业的期望收益。

We try to study how government optimally stimulates innovation and avoids government failure via subsidies and tax rebate. When the type of enterprise can be observed, the subsidy is usually unnecessary, and the optimal tax rate increases with the increase of enterprise R&D success rate. After introducing asymmetric information, the optimal incentive compatible tax rate decreases with the increase of enterprise R&D success rate. Further analyzation of the effects of different factors on the optimal policy through numerical simulation reveals that information asymmetry reduces the expected returns of the government and all enterprises.