成本信息非对称下绿色供应链谎报决策与协调机制研究

Research on decision-making and coordination mechanism of false report in green supply chain under cost information asymmetry

以一个绿色产品制造商和一个零售商组成的绿色供应链为研究对象,基于三种博弈结构探讨制造商谎报成本信息时绿色供应链决策问题。研究发现,不谎报决策时,绿色水平在RS博弈中最优,批发价格和零售价格在MS博弈中最优,且不论供应链主导力量如何,主导者能够体现出供应链利润的分配优势。当MS博弈时,制造商不会谎报成本信息;当RS和VN博弈时,制造商为追求利润最大化会高报其成本信息,且与VN博弈相比,RS博弈时制造商谎报的程度更大且其成本谎报行为导致零售商和整个供应链的绩效受损。因此,引入成本共担契约对绿色供应链进行协调,在合适的契约参数设置下,此成本共担契约能够实现绿色供应链的完美协调。

Taking a green supply chain composed of a green product manufacturer and a retailer as the research object,this paper discusses the decision-making of green supply chain when the manufacturer misreports the cost information based on three game structures.The results show that the green level is the best in RS game,and the wholesale and retail prices are the best in MS game when the decision-making is not misrepresented.Regardless of the dominant force in the supply chain,the dominant player can reflect the distribution advantage of the supply chain profit.In MS game,the manufacturer does not misrepresent the cost information.In RS and VN games,manufacturers overstate their cost information in order to maximize profits,and compared with VN game,manufacturers in RS game misstate to a greater extent and their cost misstatement can lead to the performance damage of retailers and the entire supply chain.Therefore,cost-sharing contract is introduced to coordinate the green supply chain,which can realize the perfect coordination of green supply chain with appropriate contract parameters.