考虑公众预期后悔的突发性抢购事件演化博弈分析

Evolutionary game analysis of sudden panic buying events considering the anticipated regret of the public

针对抢购事件的演化机理和防控决策问题,通过刻画公众异质性和不同类型公众的预期后悔心理,构建了不考虑和考虑预期后悔的演化博弈模型.进而推导了模型演化路径和事件引导策略的解析结果,以2020年新冠肺炎引发的双黄连口服液抢购为例进行了验证,并考查了公众预期后悔感知度和敏感型公众比例的影响.结果表明,考虑预期后悔的模型能够刻画事件的局部爆发,且不同条件下预期后悔对均衡点的影响不同;将敏感型公众比例降低至一定阈值范围内,并控制公众预期后悔感知度和系统初始状态,有助于使事件向理想均衡点演化.

For the evolution mechanism and prevention and control decisions of panic buying events,this paper presents two evolutionary game models without and with anticipated regret(AR),respectively,by describing the heterogeneity of the public and the psychologies of AR of different types of public.Furthermore,this paper deduces the analytical results of the evolution path of these models and the guiding strategy of events.The panic buying of Shuanghuanglian oral liquid caused by COVID-19 in 2020 is used as an example to verify the effectiveness of these analytical results and to test the influences of public AR perception and the proportion of sensitive public.The results show that the model with AR can describe the local outbreak of the event,and that the influence of AR on the equilibrium point is different under different conditions.Reducing the proportion of sensitive public to a certain threshold and controlling public AR perception and the initial state of the system are helpful to promote the evolution of panic buying events to the ideal equilibrium point.