粉丝经济下品牌企业的信号传递策略研究

Signaling strategy of brand enterprises under the economy of fandom

本文研究粉丝经济下,当企业类型信息不对称时,品牌企业的最优策略.考虑包含两种类型的企业(原创性品牌或模仿型企业)与两种类型的消费者群体(粉丝或一般消费者)的两级供应链,构建两种信息结构下的企业与消费者之间的策略性竞争博弈模型,得出分离均衡及混同均衡下企业的最优决策.探索了品牌企业是否应该向消费者披露企业真实类型,若披露,则如何通过价格及质量进行信号传递;进一步研究了研究消费者群体中粉丝比例与粉丝行为模式对企业决策的影响.结果表明:完全信息下,粉丝比例越大对品牌企业越有利;不完全信息下,若品牌企业选择分离均衡,当粉丝对模仿产品厌恶心理强烈时,粉丝比例越大对品牌企业却并非总是有利;即使品牌企业因前期投入大量筹建成本而导致收益低于模仿型企业,当粉丝比例足够大时,其收益终将高于模仿型企业;无论何种企业,其收益与粉丝心理收益总呈现出单调非递减性.

This paper studies the interaction between consumers and a firm,which has a fraction of brand firm’s fans,under asymmetric information.The firm can be either a brand firm or a mimic one,while the consumers cannot observe the firm’s exact type,which is private information.The research provides a dynamic,game theoretic model for the firm to signal its type through pricing and quality strategy and examines the effect of the amount of brand fans and their behavior pattern on firm decision.The results show that a brand firm could be better off with a larger fraction of brand fans under symmetric information.Whereas under asymmetric information,a large fraction of brand fans may not always be beneficial for the firm when the fans have a strong willingness to punish the mimic one.Though,due to lots of pre-construction costs,the profit of the brand firm may be less than the mimic one originally,its payoff will eventually surpass the mimic one if the fraction of fans is sufficiently large.Whatever the type of the firm,its payoff has a monotonic non-decreasing relationship with the psychological benefits of the brand fans.