认知视阈下对哈奇森道德感“先天性”和“反映性”的辨析

The“Innateness”and“Reflection”of Hutchison′s Moral Sense from the Perspective of Cognition

哈奇森的道德感官论是建立在他的认识论上,然而其对这一部分的阐释由于行文原因而显得模糊不清。在认知视阈下,哈奇森将道德感辨析为人类认识活动初级阶段的“先天感受”,是一种出自本能的对情绪的感受性能力;道德感“reflection”在人类感知实践中提供了一种出自心理实体的认知对象,因而“反思性”术语是对这一概念的误用。“反思性”较之于“反映性”已经不适合用来阐释哈奇森的道德感,因后者更能揭示情感主义的核心要义。

Hutcheson′s moral sense theory is based on his epistemology,but his interpretation of this part is ambiguous for reasons of his writing style.From the perspective of cognition,it can be seen that Hutchison distinguishes moral sense as the“innate feeling”in the primary stage of human cognitive activities is an instinctive ability to feel emotions.In addition,through the identification and clarification of the attribute of moral sense“reflection”,it is pointed out that moral sense provides a cognitive object derived from psychological entities in human perception practice,and so the term“反思性”is a misuse of this concept.Also on the basis of distinguishing the difference between“reflexivity”and“reflexivity”,the conclusion is drawn that“反映性”can better reveal the core meaning of emotionalism.