强制分红政策、代理冲突与地方国有企业绩效

Mandatory Dividend Policy,Agency Conflicts and Corporate Performance of Local State-Owned Listed Companies

随着国有企业的高速发展,其巨额利润的分配问题近年来备受关注。本文利用地方国有资本经营预算制度改革这一“强制分红政策”的外生冲击,以2005—2016年为事件时间窗口,对政策的实施效果、影响机制和异质性进行分析。结果表明:(1)强制分红政策的实施的确显著提升了地方国有上市公司的公司绩效;(2)强制分红政策对国有企业绩效的影响主要是通过制约大股东关联交易行为来完成的,即通过缓解第二类代理冲突(大股东-中小股东之间的代理冲突)对国有企业的绩效进行提升,而对第一类代理冲突(管理者-股东之间的代理冲突)无显著的影响;(3)分样本回归结果显示,在监督机制和治理机制完善程度不同的企业中,强制分红政策效果存在较大差异。在外部监督机制和约束大股东行为的治理机制相对不够完善的企业中,政策实施效果较好,呈现替代效应;而在约束管理者行为的治理机制较完善的企业中,政策实施效果较好,呈现互补效应。这也进一步证实了强制分红政策在当前的中国市场中主要缓解的是大股东-中小股东代理冲突这一结论。

With the rapid development of state-owned enterprises,the distribution of huge profits has attracted much attention in recent years.Focusing on the exogenous impact of the reform of the budget system of local state-owned capital operation,which is an implementation of the mandatory dividend policy,this paper analyzes the policy effects,influence mechanisms and heterogeneities of the mandatory dividend policy from 2005 to 2016 by using the multi-period difference-in-differences(DID)model.The results show:First,the implementation of mandatory dividend policy does significantly improve the corporate performance of local state-owned listed companies;second,paying cash dividends can reduce agency conflicts of state-owned listed companies between large shareholders and the small and medium-size shareholders,but has no significant impact on the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders;third,the sample regression results are quite different in enterprises with different supervision mechanism and governance mechanism.The mandatory dividend policy shows an alternative effect in enterprises with weaker external supervision or weaker governance mechanism restricting major shareholder behavior,and a complementary effect in enterprises with stronger governance mechanism restricting management behavior.