“结构性”去杠杆能抑制企业“影子”银行业务吗?

Can“Structural”Deleveraging Inhibit Corporate“Shadow”Banking?

基于我国2012—2019年非金融类A股上市公司数据,通过构建双重差分模型,实证研究了“结构性”去杠杆政策对企业金融类资产,特别是较为隐秘的“影子”银行业务的影响。研究发现,“结构性”去杠杆政策会显著降低企业的各类金融资产配置,既包括“影子”银行类隐性金融资产,也包括显性金融资产。中介效应检验发现,国家审计监管能强化“结构性”去杠杆的政策执行效果,更好地抑制企业“影子”银行业务,在接受市场化债转股的样本中,“结构性”去杠杆也表现出了更强的政策影响,但宏观经济政策的不确定性会弱化“结构性”去杠杆对企业“影子”银行的抑制。政府在推进“稳增长”和“去杠杆”的双重政策目标时,既要注重对政策实施和执行效果的监督,也要积极探索包括市场化债转股在内的各种创新措施,同时保持政策制定和实施的连贯性和稳定性。

Based on the panel data of China's non-financial A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2019,this paper constructs a double differential model to study the effect of“structural”deleveraging policies on corporate financial assets,especially the more secretive“shadows”banking.The article has found that the implementation of the“structural”deleveraging policy can significantly reduce the allocation of various financial assets of enterprises,including both“shadow”banking implicit financial assets and explicit financial assets.A further test of the intermediary effect has found that the national audit supervision can strengthen the policy implementation effect,and better restrain the“shadow”banking business of enterprises.The deleveraging policy has also shown a more significant policy impact,but the uncertainty of macroeconomic policies can weaken the inhibitory effect.When the government promotes the dual policy goals of“stabilizing growth”and“deleveraging”,it should not only pay attention to the supervision of policy implementation and implementation effects,but also actively explore various innovative measures including market-based debt-to-equity swaps,while maintaining coherence and stability of policy introduction and implementation.