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环保督察、政商关系与空气污染治理效果--基于中央环保督察的准实验研究 被引量:18

Environmental Protection Inspections,Government-Business Relations, and the Effects of Air Pollution Governance:A Quasi-Experimental Study Based on Central Environmental Protection Inspections
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摘要 中央环保督察已成为环境治理的重要手段与制度安排地方环境治理呈现明显的地方差异性,环保督察的效果也绝非众城一面。本文使用精确断点回归方法评估中央环保督察对空气污染的治理效果。基于政企合谋视角,分析政商关系对中央环保督察的调节作用,以及城市工业化进程、经济水平、产业结构、官员任期等因素呈现的中央环保督察效果异质性。研究发现:中央环保督察可短期改善被督察地的空气质量,但长期政策效果趋于减弱,甚至会出现污染反弹;在政商关系亲近的城市,中央环保督察对空气质量的改善程度较弱,而在政商关系相对不亲近的城市则效果更强;中央环保督察对空气污染的治理效果还存在着明显的城市异质性。 With the ongoing advances in the vertical management reforms of the environmental governance system, the Central Environmental Protection Inspection(CEPI) has become an important means and institutional arrangement for governance of the environment. There are obvious differences among local environmental governance systems and the effects of the CEPI. In this article, we collect air quality data(AQI)from the first round of Central Environmental Protection Inspectors stationed in cities from December 2015 to August 2018, and we use a Sharp Regression Discontinuity Design(SRDD) to test the policy effects of the CEPI. In addition, we attempt to further explore the regulatory effects of government-business relations on the policy effects of the CEPI from the perspective of government-enterprise collusion and to examine the heterogeneity of the policy effects of the CEPI on different city types, different levels of economic development, and different official characteristics.The results show that:① The CEPI can improve air quality in the inspected areas over the short term, but the long-term policy effects tend to weaken air quality, often even leading to a rebound in pollution;② In cities where there are close government-business relations, the CEPI is less effective in improving air quality, whereas in cities with lessclose government-business ties, the effects are stronger. In investigating this mechanism,we find that close government-business relations may lead to government-business collusion. After the departure of the CEPI team, local governments will flexibly adjust the closure of the polluting enterprises based on local economic development needs and longterm interest relations with the polluting enterprises, allowing the polluting enterprises to resume their work and production and thus affecting the implementation effects of the environmental inspections. The implementation effects will also be affected by the environmental protection inspectors;③ There remain obvious urban economic and social differences in terms of the control effects of the CEPI on air pollution. The specific performance differences include the following: Compared to high-tech, energy-focused,and service-oriented cities, the effects of the CEPI are more significant in cities that focus on heavy and light industry. In cities with a high per capita GDP, air quality improved more significantly both before and after entry of the Central Environmental Protection Inspectors. The effects of improvements in air quality in cities with a large proportion of secondary industry are weaker than those in cities with a relatively small proportion of secondary industry. There is also heterogeneity in the effects of the CEPI based on the tenure of the respective officials. As the tenure of officials increases, the policy effects of the CEPI are reduced.Based on the above conclusions, this study suggests that environmental governance should focus on avoiding the disadvantages of campaign-type enforcement and should explore ways to normalize and institutionalize the CEPI: good “ close and clean ”government-business relations should be built to reduce the negative impacts of government-enterprise collusion on environmental governance;an upgrading of urban industries and a transformation of the development mode should be promoted;efficient utilization and recycling of resources should be realized;and the traditional mode of “ treatment after pollution” should be replaced so as to achieve a win-win situation in terms of both economic development and enforcement of environmental protection.
作者 李智超 刘少丹 杨帆 LI Zhichao;LIU Shaodan;YANG Fan(School of Political Science and Public Administration,East China University of Political Science and Law)
出处 《公共管理评论》 CSSCI 2021年第4期105-131,共27页 China Public Administration Review
基金 国家自然科学基金面上项目“智慧城市建设中的多元主体协同、治理网络与演化机理研究”(项目批准号:71974057) 上海哲学社会科学规划项目“大数据驱动的大气污染跨区域协同治理机制研究”(项目批准号:2018BGL008)资助。
关键词 环保督察 政商关系 运动式治理 断点回归 空气污染治理 central environmental protection inspections government-business relations campaign-style governance regression discontinuity design air pollution governance
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