提级调查、官员腐败与地方安全生产治理效果--来自湖南省14个地级市准自然实验的经验证据

Upgraded Investigations, Official Corruption, and the Effectiveness of Local Safety Production Governance--Empirical Evidence from Quasi-natural Experiments in 14 Prefectural-level Cities

基于湖南省14个地级市的平衡面板数据,将提级调查政策实施视为一项准自然实验,运用广义差分模型评估提级调查对地方安全生产治理的影响效应,并利用调节效应模型考察官员腐败行为可能存在的调节作用。研究结果显示:提级调查对地方安全生产治理效果具有明显的促进效应,与未被提级调查的城市相比,政策实施城市的亿元GDP生产安全事故死亡率下降11.72%。在经过平行趋势检验、安慰剂检验、PSM-DID检验与政策唯一性检验后,该结论依旧成立。进一步拓展分析表明,官员腐败在提级调查对安全生产治理效果的影响中起到了负向调节作用,在一定程度上抑制了政策实施效果。本研究为创新安全生产政策法规和改善地方安全生产治理效果提供了借鉴。

Based on balanced panel data from 14 prefectural-level cities in Hunan province, implementation of the upgraded survey policy is regarded as a quasi-natural experiment and a generalized difference model is used to evaluate the impact of the upgraded survey on local safety production governance and a moderating effect model is used to investigate the possible moderating effects of official corruption. The results of the study show that the upgraded survey has a significant effect on local production safety governance. Compared with cities that have not been exposed to the upgraded survey, the death rate from production safety accidents in cities with a GDP of 100 million yuan that implement the policy has dropped by 11. 72 percent. After a parallel trend test, a placebo test, a PSM-DID test, and a policy uniqueness test, this conclusion still remains valid.Further analysis shows that official corruption has played a negative regulatory role on the impact of the upgraded investigation on the effects of safety production governance and to a certain extent has inhibited the effects of this policy implementation. This research provides a reference for innovating safety production policies and regulations and for improving the effects of local safety production governance.