证券交易所一线监管与公司CFO离职--基于财务报告问询函的视角

Frontline Regulation of Stock Exchanges and CFO Turnover:From the Perspective of Financial Report Inquiry Letters

以上市公司收到交易所财务报告问询函为研究对象,利用2015-2019年沪深A股上市公司的样本,研究交易所财务报告问询函对公司CFO离职的影响。结果表明,财务报告问询显著提高了CF0离职的概率,且针对前一年年报或当年季报/半年报的收函总数越多,CFO离职概率越高。异质性分析发现,在公司信息披露质量差、外部制度环境好的情况下,财务报告问询对CFO离职的影响更显著。进一步分析发现,财务报告问询主要提高了执行能力较弱CF0的离职概率,CF0离职后公司股价崩盘风险显著降低;同时,当继任CF0执行能力较强时,股价崩盘风险会显著下降。上述结果表明,财务报告问询制度能够发挥信息和监管效应,通过高管人员CF0的交更,提高公司信息披露质量,促进资本市场健康发展。

Taking the financial report inquiry letters of stock exchanges received by listed compa-nies as research objects,this paper makes use of the samplcs of A-sharc listcd companics in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2015 to 2019 to study the impact of financial report inquiry let-ters of stock exchanges on CFO turnover.The findings show that the financial report inquiry letters have significantly increased the probability of CFO turnover.And the more the number of letters re-ceived concerning the previous year's annual report or the quarterly/semi-annual reports of the same year,the higher the probability of CFOs'leave.It is found through the heterogeneity analysis that in the context of poor quality of corporate information disclosure and good external institutional environ-ment,the impact of financial report inquiry letters on CFO turnover will be more significant.Further analysis shows that the financial report inquiry letters mainly increase the turnover of CFOs with low-er executive ability,and the risks of stock price crash is significantly reduced after these CFOs leav-ing office;meanwhile,when the executive ability of the successor CFO is stronger,the risks of stock price crash will also be significantly reduced.The above-mentioned results show that the financial re-port inquiry letters can play an informative and regulatory role,improve the quality of corporate infor-mation disclosure and promote the healthy development of the capital market through CFOs turnover.