官员晋升激励与企业实际税负——来自制造业上市企业的证据

Politician's Promotion Incentives and Effective Tax Rates:Evidence from Manufacturing Enterprises

本文以2009—2015年中国制造业A股上市公司作为数据样本,实证考察地方官员晋升激励对辖区企业实际税负的影响。实证结果发现,官员的晋升激励显著降低了企业实际税负,该影响对处于东部地区企业的实际税负影响更为显著,对国有企业和有政治关联企业的实际税负的降低作用更为明显。此外,本文探索官员晋升对企业实际税负的作用机制,揭示了税收征管强度在二者关系中的中介作用。以此阐释了地方官员晋升所带来的税收征管变化,以期为中国未来的税制改革提供一定的启示。

Using the sample of publicly listed Chinese firms from 2009 to 2015,this study empirically examines the impact of local politician's promotion incentives on firms’effective tax rates within their jurisdictions.The results demon⁃strate local politicians’promotion incentives significantly decrease firms’real tax rate and such effect is more pronounced among firms(i)located in Eastern part of China;(ii)Under the control of the state;(iii)with political connections.Mean⁃while,this study discusses possible mechanisms and indicates that politicians may adjust tax enforcements in their jurisdic⁃tions to accommodate their promotion incentives.Overall,this study not only explains the effect of politicians’political in⁃centives on local tax enforcement,but also provides valuable policy implications to China's reform of the taxation system.