地方政府债券对财政金融系统性风险传导机制的研究

The Contagion Mechanism of Local Government Public Bonds and the Fiscal-financial Systemic Risk

2015年起正式实施的新《预算法》允许地方政府公开发行债券后,全国性商业银行交叉持有地方债,在地方政府债务区域不平衡背景下,银行间交易网络导致地方债务危机的传染性大幅增加,增大引发财政金融系统性重大风险的可能性。本文构建博弈模型对地方政府债券进入银行交叉持有网络后形成的财政-金融风险传导机制开展研究,认为统一金融市场下公开发行债券可以实现风险分散,但是以扩大传染范围和提高传染速度为代价,而且不能完全排除转移支付纾困的统一金融市场对低风险地方政府造成不公待遇。基于此,本文提出应基于金融网络视角对地方财政领域的具体风险制定预案,把握预见性和主动性,防范化解财政金融领域系统性重大风险。

The 2015 new budget law entitles local governments to issue bonds which are cross holden by the commercial banks,but the spatial risk from local fiscal imbalance pervades the financial network widely through interbank trading network,thus increasing contagion risk of local debt crisis dramatically,therefore inducing fiscal-financial systemic risk.This paper constructs a micro behavior model for the fiscal-financial risk transmission mechanism,in which the higher the quality of local government bonds,the more the banks holding bonds as mortgage can finance,and the easier the projects are to achieve the optimal scale,consequently the more abundant the local fiscal resources.However,the inter-bank network constitutes a natural channel for local default contagion,as a result the collateral devaluation caused by local defaults might cause a systemic credit contraction.Local bond issuance in the unified financial market has realized risk diversification,but at the cost of larger scope and higher speed of risk contagion.Moreover,the incomplete commitment to no-bailout is prone to cause welfare losses in areas with lower fiscal risk.