疾控机构与行政主管部门的信任博弈分析

Analysis of the trust game between the CDC and the administrative department

文章对疾控机构和行政部门信任的囚徒困境和无限重复博弈进行了分析,表明在无限重复博弈过程中,冷酷策略能改变博弈的均衡,化解信任的囚徒困境;同时,外部的监督和政府的奖惩策略亦能改变双方的博弈均衡,促进信任机制的形成。显然,行政管理部门在具体的疾病防控工作中唯有给予专业机构充分的信任才能更好地采纳专家的建议和意见,这对促进疾控机构和行政部门的互信有非常重要的现实意义。

It seemed that there was less trust between the CDC and the administrative departments.Therefore the article analyzes the prisoner's dilemma and infinitely repeated games of trust between them,and the results say that in the process of infinitely repeated games,grim strategies can change the balance of the game and resolve the prisoner's dilemma of trust.At the same time,external supervision and government reward and punishment strategies can also change the balance of the game between the two parties and promote the formation of a trust mechanism.