期刊文献+

政府专利资助与企业专利申请的演化博弈分析 被引量:4

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Government Patent Subsidy and Enterprise Patent Application
下载PDF
导出
摘要 [研究目的]分析地方政府专利资助退出是否能够有效遏制投机性专利申请行为,探讨不同专利资助退出方式对地方政府和企业策略选择的影响机制。[研究方法]建立地方政府和企业间的演化博弈模型,分析双方的演化稳定策略。[研究结论]在不同条件下,专利资助博弈系统中地方政府、企业双方博弈可以形成4个稳定均衡的策略组合,分别是{无专利资助,非投机性专利申请}、{专利资助,非投机性专利申请}、{无专利资助,投机性专利申请}和{专利资助,投机性专利申请};专利授权的信号性收益和垄断性收益增加能加速企业投机性专利申请概率向0收敛,而投机性专利获得授权概率和投机性收益的增加会促进企业的投机性专利申请行为;不同专利资助退出方式均能实现{无专利资助,非投机性专利申请}的稳态策略,动态专利资助退出方式下,双方演化博弈趋向稳态策略的速度更慢。相关结论可以为地方政府建立专利资助退出机制、优化专利申请环境提供理论基础和参考。 [Research purpose]This paper analyzes whether local government patent subsidy withdrawal can effectively reduce the speculative behavior of patent application,and explore the influence mechanism of different ways of patent subsidy withdrawal on the strategy choice of local government and enterprises.[Research method]The paper establish an evolutionary game model between local government and enterprise,and analyzes the evolutionary stability strategies of both sides.[Research conclusion]Under different conditions,the game between local government and enterprise in the patent subsidy game system can form four stable and balanced strategy combinations,which are{no patent subsidy,non-speculative patent application},{patent subsidy,non-speculative patent application},{no patent subsidy,speculative patent application}and{patent subsidy,speculative patent application}respectively.The increase of signal income and monopoly income of patent grant can accelerate the convergence of the probability of speculative patent application to zero,while the increase of the probability of granting speculative patent and speculative income will promote the speculative patent application behavior of enterprises.Different patent subsidy exit methods can achieve the steady-state strategy of{no patent funding,non-speculative patent application}.Under the dynamic patent subsidy exit mode,the evolutionary game between the two sides tends to develop into the steady-state strategy more slowly.The relevant conclusions can provide theoretical basis and reference for local governments to establish patent subsidy withdrawal mechanism and optimize the patent application environment.
作者 孙勇 马园庭 张亚峰 Sun Yong;Ma Yuanting;Zhang Yafeng(School of Public Policy and Management,University of Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100049;Institutes of Science and Development,Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100190;School of Economics and Management,East China Jiaotong University,Nanchang330013)
出处 《情报杂志》 CSSCI 北大核心 2022年第5期198-206,F0003,共10页 Journal of Intelligence
基金 国家自然科学基金青年项目“涉外专利诉讼的企业策略选择机理和中国专利制度回应”(编号:72104228) 中国博士后科学基金第68批面上资助项目“涉外专利诉讼对企业创新的影响:中国视角与中国应对”(编号:2020M680653)研究成果之一。
关键词 企业专利 专利资助 专利申请 技术创新 演化博弈 地方政府 enterprises patent patent subsidy patent application technological innovation evolutionary game local government
  • 相关文献

参考文献20

二级参考文献261

共引文献966

同被引文献50

引证文献4

二级引证文献4

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部