摘要
电商平台“二选一”行为的经济效果具有双重性和不易评估性,由此带来了行为风险的不确定性,因此不适合运用常规手段判定该行为。同时,放任此种行为使其常态化必然带来连锁反应。专门用于控制垄断危险的特殊工具———反垄断承诺制度具有温和性、效率性和协商性,适度改造承诺的启动模式、完善内容协商程序、加强对经营者履行承诺的监督,有利于解决“二选一”行为处理中的难题。
The economic effects of the“either-or choice”behavior on e-commerce platforms are dual and not easy to evaluate,which causes the uncertainty about behavioral risk and further leads to the inadaptation in the use of conventional means to define the behavior.Meanwhile,the normalization of this behavior is bound to have a chain reaction.The antitrust commitment system,as a special tool for controlling monopolistic risk,integrates mildness,efficiency and negotiation,which is helpful to solve the dilemma of the behavior.It is necessary to moderately reform the initiation mode of the commitment procedure,improve the negotiation procedure,strengthen the supervision of the operators’performance and so on,so as to optimize the application effect of antitrust commitment system in the behavior.
作者
缪慧
Miao Hui(Civil,Commercial and Economic Law School China University of Political Science and Law,Beijing 100088,China)
出处
《北京化工大学学报(社会科学版)》
2022年第1期38-45,共8页
Journal of Beijing University of Chemical Technology(Social Sciences Edition)
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目“完善市场监管中的权力配置及运行制约法律机制研究”(20AZD107)。
关键词
电商平台
“二选一”
垄断性风险
二元属性
反垄断承诺
e-commerce platform
either-or choice
monopolistic risk
binary attributes
antitrust commitment