业绩考核制度能否促进中央企业突出主业?——基于业绩考核制度第三次修订的准自然实验

Does the Performance Appraisal System Promote Central Enterprises to Highlight Their Main Business?——A Quasi-natural Experiment Based on the Third Revision of the Performance Appraisal System

基于2007-2019年A股上市公司数据,本文采用双重差分模型以2013年第三次修订的业绩考核办法为准自然实验,研究发现,新《考核办法》有利于促进中央企业剥离非相关多元化回归主业;其通过抑制高管在职消费、缓解薪酬激励不足,发挥监督与激励的双重作用进而促使中央企业突出主业;该作用在市场化进程较低地区及竞争性行业更为显著;并且促使中央企业研发投入由非主业项目向主业项目转移,提升企业主业业绩。

Based on the data of A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2019,this paper adopts the Difference-in-Differences model to take the performance appraisal system revised for the third time in 2013 as a quasi-natural experiment.The study found that the new“appraisal system”is conducive to promoting the separation of non-related diversification of central enterprises and return to their main business;it exerts the dual role of supervision and incentives by restraining senior executives’in-service consumption and alleviating the lack of salary incentives,thereby urging the central enterprises to highlight their main business;this effect is more significant in regions with a low marketization process and in competitive industries;it also promotes the transfer of central enterprises’R&D investment from non-main business projects to main business projects,and enhances the performance of the main business of enterprises.