平台宏观风险与平台反垄断

Platform Macro-risk and Antitrust Regulation

本文对平台停业引致的宏观风险进行分析,并阐述了该风险对于平台反垄断与平台监管的政策意义。通过构建理论模型将外生冲击与平台存活概率引入双边市场,对不同市场结构下平台经济的抗风险能力进行分析,本文发现,随着冲击强度增大,与单平台垄断市场相比,双平台寡头市场社会福利下降速度更慢,抗风险能力更强。当面临低强度外部冲击时,在网络效应和规模经济的作用下,单平台垄断市场社会福利水平更高;当面临高强度外部冲击时,双平台寡头市场的强抗风险能力使其社会福利水平高于单平台垄断市场。本研究为平台反垄断和平台风险监管提供了新的理论视角。

The article analyzes the macro-risk induced by the default of online peer-to-peer lending platforms and elaborate on its significant theoretical and policy implications for antitrust and regulation.We incorporate exogenous shocks and platform survival probability into a two-sided market model to analyze and compare the anti-risk capabilities of platform economies under different market structures.Theoretical results show that shocks will lead to a faster decline in social welfare in a monopolistic market with a single platform,as opposed to an oligopolistic market with two platforms,suggesting that the latter is more robust in the face of shocks.When external shocks are relatively small,the monopolistic platform market can reach a higher social welfare level due to network effects and economics of scale.However,as the magnitude of external shocks increases,the oligopolistic market with multiple platforms will achieve higher level of social welfare relative to the monopolistic market.This research presents a new theoretical framework for analyzing antitrust issues on two-sided markets through a new perspective of systemic risk management.