制度配套与体制运作:对台湾地区行政与立法关系的一项分析

Institutional Collocation and Institutional Operation:An Analysis of the Relationship between Administration and Legislation in Taiwan

台湾地区通过数次“修宪”,确立混合“双首长制”的政治体制,其与选举制度、政党体系等的制度配套引导了行政与立法关系的互动,这种“政务优越”倾向的“双首长制”在分立政府会容易形成行政与立法、朝野政党之间立法冲突,即便是在一致政府的型态下,若朝野政党的政策分歧强度提高,在野党会通过党团协商与议事抗争策略,削弱一致政府下执政党在立法机构的议程设定优势,使立法多数决原则移向共识决原则,进而使既有体制的行政-立法的运作难度提升。

The Taiwan region has adopted several constitutional amendments to establish a mixed “dual-executive system” political system,which complements the electoral system and the political party system to guide the interaction between administrative and legislative relations.The separate government in which executive sections establish its political supremacy can easily lead to legislative conflicts between the executive and legislative parties.However,even in the form of a unified government,if the differences political stances of the opposition parties increase,the opposition parties will use the party negotiation and resistance strategies to weaken the advantage of the ruling party,which makes the majority rule of decision-making moves to the principle of consensus decision in legislation,thereby making the operation of the administration and legislation more difficult.