会计师事务所行业专长与商誉减值

Accounting firm industry specialization and goodwill impairment

商誉减值是一个复杂的判断过程,这意味着审计师对商誉减值进行审计面临较高风险。因此,审计师的胜任能力尤为重要。已有文献发现,行业专长审计师能够提高客户会计信息质量,但其对客户商誉减值行为的影响如何,尚有待研究。文章利用中国A股上市公司及其审计师数据,考察了会计师事务所行业专长对上市公司商誉减值计提的影响。结果发现,行业专长审计师会促使公司更多地计提商誉减值,但上述作用仅存在于法律环境较好地区。因此,法律环境与高质量审计师之间可能是互补关系。进一步研究表明,公司实际存在商誉减值时,行业专长审计师会促使公司更多计提商誉减值;而当公司存在“洗大澡”动机时,行业专长审计师对公司的商誉减值计提行为并无显著影响。因此,行业专长审计师的作用可能主要体现在避免公司不及时确认商誉减值上,对于管理层利用多提商誉减值准备来实现“洗大澡”目的并无明显抑制作用,这可能与审计师更容易接受较稳健的会计处理有关。这一研究将行业专长审计师与公司商誉减值会计行为联系起来,有助于加深对行业专长审计师作用以及公司商誉减值行为影响因素的理解。

Goodwill impairment involves a complex judgment process.Accordingly,the audit of goodwill impairment is characterized by high risks.Related to this,the competence of auditors is of particular importance.Prior studies have found that auditor industry expertise is positively related to a client′s accounting quality;however,whether and how it affects goodwill impairment accounting practice remains unknown.The current paper uses the data of A-share nonfinancial companies and their auditors for the 2008-2018 period to examine the impacts of firm-level industry experts on the recognition of goodwill impairment.We propose two hypotheses.Hypothesis 1 argues that auditor industry expertise can significantly increase a company′s probability of recognizing goodwill impairment and that auditor industry expertise is positively related with the scale of goodwill impairment loss recognition.Hypothesis 2 argues that the role of auditor industry expertise depends on the regional legal environment.Hypothesis 2 is presented in the form of competitive hypotheses.Specifically,Hypothesis 2 a states that the role of auditor industry expertise is more profound in regions with stronger legal environment,while Hypothesis 2 b states that the role of auditor industry expertise is more profound in regions with weaker legal environment.Then,we used logistic regression test and Tobit regression test to test Hypothesis 1.Results show that auditor industry expertise can increase both the likelihood of recording goodwill impairment and the magnitude of recognizing goodwill impairment loss.Thus,Hypothesis 1 is supported.We further use“legal environment index”and the number of full-time lawyers in the population to measure the level of regional rule of law,after which we examine the roles of auditor industry expertise in different legal environments.Results demonstrate that auditor industry expertise has a significant impact on goodwill impairment,but only in regions with good legal environments.Thus,Hypothesis 2 a is supported,because a good legal environment can prompt auditors to be more diligent,which in turn,more effectively inhibits the management′s use of discretion in goodwill impairment accounting to achieve earnings management purposes.The varying roles of auditor industry expertise in different legal environments also demonstrate the complementary nature of the legal environment and auditor industry expertise.This paper further examines the role of auditor industry expertise when a company′s goodwill is likely impaired and the management has the so-called“big bath”incentive.In particular,we explore the effect of auditor industry expertise on goodwill impairment recognition using the indicator variable for market-to-book ratios(MTB)decrease as the primary market indication of goodwill impairment.Results reveal that when a company′s goodwill is expected to be impaired(i.e.,MTB decreases compared to previous period),the industry expert auditor will prompt the company to recognize goodwill impairment in a more timely and sufficient manner.However,when the management has a“big bath”motive,the auditor industry expertise has no significant effect on goodwill impairment recognition.Therefore,the role of auditor industry expertise only exists when management has an incentive to delay recognition goodwill impairment.In comparison,the role is very weak when management has the“big bath”incentive by recording more goodwill impairment.This can be partly attributed to the fact that an auditor prefers conservative accounting treatments.Finally,we perform a battery of robust tests and achieved the same results.This paper makes several contributions to the literature.First,by linking auditor industry expertise with the company′s goodwill impairment accounting practices,this paper helps deepen our understanding of the role of auditor industry expertise and the factors that influence management′s goodwill impairment behavior.Second,as goodwill impairment accounting is a typical item for which the management can use their discretion,this paper helps unpack the relationship between auditor industry expertise and financial reporting quality by examining the effect of the former on goodwill impairment.Third,this paper helps us understand the effect of auditor industry expertise on management′s opportunistic financial reporting behavior.It does so by exploring the impact of the such expertise on goodwill impairment recognition when the client′s goodwill is likely impaired and the management has the“big bath”incentive using discretion over goodwill impairment.Fourth,this paper helps us further understand the relationship between legal systems and industry audit experts by providing evidence about the differential impact of auditor industry expertise on goodwill impairment in various legal environments.The results of this paper demonstrate the complementary relationship between legal systems and auditor quality.Finally,this paper offers policy implications to help accounting firms strengthen industry-specific investment and assist securities regulatory departments in strengthening their supervision of goodwill impairment accounting.