摘要
针对由单个制造商和单个电商平台构成的在线销售系统,本文构建了不引入平台渠道时电商平台是否引入自有品牌、引入平台渠道时电商平台是否引入自有品牌的四个决策模型,通过比较消费者购买不同渠道、不同品牌商品获得的效用,得出在线销售系统中不同渠道、不同品牌商品的需求函数,结合最优化方法和博弈论,在电商平台自有品牌引入决策内生的条件下研究了平台渠道的引入决策。研究发现:当消费者对电商平台自有品牌的偏好较高且平台渠道的佣金费率处于较高范围内时,制造商引入平台渠道以阻止电商平台引入自有品牌;不引入平台渠道时,电商平台引入自有品牌后制造商商品的边际收益增加,而引入平台渠道时,电商平台引入自有品牌后制造商商品的边际收益减小;随着消费者对电商平台自有品牌商品偏好的增加,制造商的收益可能增加,而电商平台的收益可能减小。
In the past two decades,store brands achieved remarkable enhanced competitiveness and profitability.Nielsen reported that store brand product sales in major retail chains in the United States reached 129 billion dollars in 2018,with an increase of 4.4%from the previous year,and the growth rate of store brands was four times higher than that of manufacturers′brands.With the rapid development of e-commerce in recent years,competition in the online retail market has become increasingly fierce.To enhance competitiveness and improve profitability,several large e-commerce platforms(e.g.,Amazon and Flipkart)introduced store brands.Amazon introduced its first store brand in 2009,and currently,more than 70 types of store brand products are sold on the platform.Brands on Flipkart,including Flipkart Smart Buy,MarQ,and Perfect Homes,are also Flipkart store brands.In China,under pressure from intensified competition in e-commerce platforms and the promotion of supply-side reforms,Dangdang and JD also introduced store brands.Dangdang Youpin went online in 2012,with a monthly sales of more than 10 million yuan.In 2018,JD also introduced a number of store brands,such as J.ZAO.While selling store brand products,e-commerce platforms allow manufacturers to sell products through sales channels on the platform.Two main sales channels exist,that is,(1)reseller channels,wherein manufacturers wholesale products to the e-commerce platform,and the e-commerce company then sell to consumers,product ownership belongs to the e-commerce platform,and(2)marketplace channels,wherein manufacturers open flagship or specialty stores on the e-commerce platform to sell directly to consumers,and pay a certain commission fee amount to the e-commerce platform based on the product category,the product ownership belongs to the manufacturers.When launching a marketplace channel,manufacturers have direct pricing rights for products,and adjusting the supply and demand relationship of products is easy.Therefore,some manufacturers that initially had only a reseller channel launched a marketplace channel,such as VIVO and Three Squirrels.In addition to wholesale products to JD,these manufacturers opened official flagship stores on JD to sell products directly to consumers.Based on the above realistic background,this study intends to explore the following questions:(1)When will an e-commerce platform introduce a store brand?(2)Will an e-commerce platform′s store brand introduction decision influence the launch of a arketplace channel?If so,what are the implications?(3)If the manufacturer launches a marketplace channel and the e-commerce platform introduces a store brand,there will be both selling format competition and product competition in the online sales system,how will the manufacturer′s and e-commerce platform′s revenues change under dual competition?In response to the above issues,we build an online sales system consisting of one manufacturer and one e-commerce platform and model four different scenarios of the e-commerce platform′s store brand introduction strategy and the manufacturer′s marketplace channel launch strategy:(1)the manufacturer does not launch a marketplace channel,and the e-commerce platform does not introduce a store brand(called the NN strategy);(2)the manufacturer does not launch a marketplace channel,and the e-commerce platform introduces a store brand(called the NS strategy);(3)the manufacturer launches a marketplace channel,and the e-commerce platform does not introduce a store brand(called the IN strategy);and(4)the manufacturer launches a marketplace channel,and the e-commerce platform introduces a store brand(called the IS strategy).By comparing the utility obtained by consumers from purchasing products from different channels and different brands,we derive the demand functions of products of different channels and different brands in the online sales system under the different strategies.Based on the optimization method and game theory,we use the endogenous conditions of the e-commerce platform′s store brand introduction decision making to examine the launch decision for the marketplace channel.Research shows that when a marketplace channel is not launched,the manufacturer′s marginal revenue increases after the introduction of a store brand on the e-commerce platform.Conversely,when a marketplace channel is launched,the manufacturer′s marginal revenue decreases after the introduction of a store brand on the e-commerce platform.If the manufacturer does not launch a marketplace channel,then the e-commerce platform will consistently introduce a store brand.If the manufacturer launches a marketplace channel,when the commission rate of the marketplace channel is low,then the e-commerce platform will introduce a store brand.However,when consumers′preference for the e-commerce platform′s store brand product and the commission rate of the marketplace channel is high,the e-commerce platform will not introduce a store brand.When consumers have a high preference for the store brand product and the commission rate of the marketplace channel is within a relatively high range,the manufacturer will launch a marketplace channel to prevent the e-commerce platform from introducing a store brand.As consumers′preference for the store brand product increases,the manufacturer′s revenue may increase,while the e-commerce platform′s revenue may decrease.
作者
段玉兰
王勇
文悦
石国强
DUAN Yulan;WANG Yong;WEN Yue;SHI Guoqiang(School of Economics and Business Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400044,China;Chongqing Key Laboratory of Modern Logistics,Chongqing 400044,China;College of Business Planning,Chongqing Technology and Business University,Chongqing 400067,China)
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2022年第3期203-214,共12页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71672015)
国家社会科学基金资助项目(15ZDB169)
重庆市研究生科研创新项目(CYB19026)。
关键词
电商平台
平台渠道引入
自有品牌
博弈论
E-commerce platform
Marketplace channel launch
Store brand
Game theory