全渠道模式下制造商与零售商的O2O合作策略研究

Offline to online cooperation strategy between a manufacturer and a retailer under omni-channel mode

本文针对制造商线上直销渠道存在退货风险而线下零售商存在缺货损失的问题,研究制造商如何与其线下零售商展开“线下体验、线上购买”O2O合作以实现全渠道高效运营。本文考虑产品匹配率和线下库存水平对消费者购买行为的影响分别构建了无O2O合作和O2O合作情形下的博弈模型,通过对比两种情形中的最优批发价格和订货量分析了O2O合作的影响,获得了制造商与零售商的最优O2O合作策略。研究表明,O2O合作不仅能够减轻制造商线上退货风险,一定条件下还有助于线下零售商减少缺货损失,但O2O合作并不总是对制造商和零售商都有利,只有在产品匹配率比较低且退货处理成本处于中间水平时,双方利润才会都得到提升从而自愿达成O2O合作;当产品匹配率比较低且退货处理成本比较高时,若制造商实施O2O合作会遭到零售商的反对,其他条件下O2O合作会使零售商受益但有损制造商利润,对此制造商可根据供应链利润的变化基于讨价还价博弈设计转移支付契约促成与零售商的O2O合作并实现双赢。

With the fast development of information technology and e-commerce,the integration of online and offline channels is experiencing rapid growth.At present,the omni-channel mode has become the development trend of the retail industry.In practice,due to the rapid change of market trends,offline retailers are often difficult to precisely forecast the market demand and thus face the problem of stock-out.Meanwhile,the manufacturers′online direct channels are often confronted with high return risks due to the lack of physical experience.Thus,some manufacturers have begun to cooperate with their offline retailers to realize omni-channel operations.For example,Inman(a well-known clothing brand in China)cooperates with its offline retailer,in which the latter display in its store an exhibit with the same attributes as the product sold online,and then guide consumers faced with stock-out to experience the exhibit offline and then purchase online.Under this scenario,when the store is out of stock,consumers can first check whether the product matches their needs by experiencing the exhibit offline,and then go online to make a purchase,which would decrease online product returns.Thus,the manufacturer′s profit loss caused by product returns can be reduced.Moreover,the retailer can also obtain revenues that guide consumers to experience the exhibit offline and then purchase online.However,the revenues paid to the retailer increase the operating cost of the manufacturer,and may change the retailer′s order quantity,which in turn affects the manufacturer′s profit gain generated from the wholesale price.Thus,our paper investigates how a manufacturer should cooperate with its offline retailer through the“experience offline and buy online”strategy(O2 O mode).This is important for supply chain members to satisfy consumers′product experience needs and solve the problem of offline stock-out and then improve the efficiency of the whole supply chain.Under such background,we focus on a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer with a direct online channel and an offline retailer,and study the optimal O2 O cooperation strategy between the manufacturer and the retailer.First,using consumer utility theory,we characterize the impacts of product fit probability and offline inventory level on the demand of different channels,after which we construct game-theoretical models under the cases of non-O2 O cooperation and O2 O cooperation,respectively.Second,we explore the impacts of O2 O cooperation on the manufacturer and the retailer,compare the optimal wholesale price and inventory decisions before and after O2 O cooperation,and discuss whether the O2 O cooperation can weaken the manufacturer′s online return risk or reduce the retailer′s stock-out loss.Then,we obtain the equilibrium O2 O cooperation strategy for supply chain members by comparing the profits of the manufacturer and the retailer under different O2 O cooperation cases.We also discuss the improvement of the O2 O cooperation strategy from the perspective of the whole supply chain.Finally,we use numerical examples to analyze the impacts of some critical parameters,such as the return handling cost and the product fit probability,on the O2 O cooperation strategy of the supply chain.Our findings reveal that O2 O cooperation affects the profit of the manufacturer from two aspects.On the one hand,O2 O cooperation provides consumers with a better product experience,thereby reducing the manufacturer′s online return cost.On the other hand,the commission paid by the manufacturer under O2 O cooperation will reduce the order quantity of the retailer,thus decreasing the manufacturer′s wholesale revenue.Similarly,O2 O cooperation also has two-aspect effects on the profit of the retailer.One is that the commission paid by the manufacturer in O2 O cooperation increases its profit,and the other is that O2 O cooperation may cause the manufacturer to raise the wholesale price,thus reducing the retailer′s marginal profit.Whether O2 O cooperation can bring positive revenue to the manufacturer or the retailer depends on the abovementioned factors.When the product fit probability is relatively low and the return handling cost is at a middle level,both the manufacturer and the retailer can benefit from O2 O cooperation and thus agree to cooperate voluntarily.However,when the product fit probability is relatively low and the return handling cost is relatively high,the retailer becomes reluctant to engage in O2 O cooperation.When both the product fit probability and the return handling cost are relatively low,or if the product fit probability is sufficiently high,the manufacturer becomes reluctant to engage in O2 O cooperation.At this time,the manufacturer can design a transfer payment contract based on a bargaining game to promote O2 O cooperation with the retailer and leads to a win-win situation for all supply chain members.Finally,compared with the case of non-O2 O cooperation,the manufacturer should increase or decrease the wholesale price in O2 O cooperation according to return handling cost and product fit probability,while the retailer should always reduce the order quantity no matter how the manufacturer′s wholesale price changes.