检查制度下可追溯食品供应链安全努力决策

Safety decision of traceable food supply chain under an inspection system

本文研究了检查制度下的可追溯食品供应链中供应链安全努力水平决策问题。考虑追溯制度中的追溯水平与检查制度中的检查精度和检查失败惩罚成本等因素,本文建立供应链的利润函数,求解食品供应链选择最高安全努力的条件,分析检查精度、检查失败惩罚成本和追溯水平对食品供应链的安全努力水平的影响。研究发现:对于检查制度而言,单一的检查精度的提升不能完全激励食品生产商的安全努力投入,这与食品安全投入成本有较大的关系;当检查精度较大,当食品安全努力成本较小时,供应链安全努力水平随着追溯水平的提高而增加,但当食品安全努力成本较大时,供应链安全努力水平随着追溯水平的提高而下降。总之,检查失败惩罚成本对食品供应链的约束作用依附于监管者和零售商对食品供应者的检查力度。对于追溯制度而言,当检查精度较小时,追溯制度对食品生产商起到积极作用,随着追溯水平提高,供应链安全努力水平提高。

Research source of the problem:the frequent global food safety incidents have attracted widespread attention worldwide.Countries around the world have introduced corresponding regulations to govern food safety issues.As the two most common mechanisms used by regulators to constrain the behavior of the food supply chain,traceability and inspection systems play a critical role in regulating the level of food safety in the market.The mutual influence of safety regulations has a common effect on the safety behavior of food supply chains.Then,under the joint constraints of the two systems,how high is the level of safety efforts that a food supply chain is willing to disburse?Under which circumstances is the food supply chain willing to pay the highest level of food safety efforts?How do the intensity of inspection,the penalty cost of inspection failure,and the level of traceability affect the level of safety efforts of food supply chains?Description of the problem:the food supply chain invests in food safety efforts to produce food in a centralized food supply chain.Food safety inspection agencies or third-party agencies sample and test the food provided by the food manufacturer in the supply chain.The nature of the food itself and the intensity of inspection jointly determined whether the food is qualified,and based on the test results,the food is returned or accepted.However,the test results are not completely accurate,and there may be sampling or diagnostic errors during the inspection process.When inspections are made incorrectly,food with potential safety hazards flows into the retailer.After the secondary processing by the retailer,it may cause food safety incidents when entering the market.The traceability system is used to trace the responsibility of the food supply chain and help the consumers obtain compensation from the supply chain.In this context,the main issues studied in this paper are how food supply chains should set the food safety effort level and in what context they are willing to maximize their safety effort level.Method model of research:this paper studies the decision-making problem of the food safety effort level in the food supply chain that can be traced under the inspection system.Considering the traceability level,the inspection intensity,the penalty cost of inspection failure and two errors in inspection system,establish the profit function of the food manufacturer,solve the conditions for the food supply chain to choose the highest safety effort,and analyze the impact of inspection intensity,traceability level and inspection failure cost on the manufacturer’s safety effort level.Problems-solving ideas:the sequence of events is as follows.First,the food supply chain puts in safety efforts,and the manufacturer produces food.Secondly,the regulator conducts safety inspections on the food provided by the manufacturer,and the inspection has two types of errors.Subsequently,the batches that fail the test are returned to the food manufacturer,and the food supply chain bears the penalty cost for failing the inspection.After that,the retailer reprocesses the products that pass the inspection and sells these products to the market.If consumers consume food with food safety hazards,a food safety incident can occur.Finally,the supervisor traces the responsibility of the food supply chain through the traceability system.Research result:a single increase in inspection intensity for the inspection system cannot fully motivate food producers to improve their safety effort level.It is also strongly related to the cost of food safety efforts.As a result,if the inspection intensity is low,the effort level for food safety increases in the traceability level.Suppose there are a high inspection intensity and a low food safety effort cost,the effort level for food safety increases in traceability level.However,if there is a high inspection intensity and a high food safety effort cost,the food safety effort level of the supply chain decreases in the traceability level.Finally,the restraining effect of the penalty cost of inspection failure on the food safety effort level of the food supply chain depends on the intensity of inspections.The introduction of case data:the data in the article is referenced with the former related papers in the portion.Thus,the results of the numerical analysis in the paper can reflect reality better.Contributions:our research differs from literature in that we consider core government regulations,establish a profit model for food supply chain members under both the traceability system and the inspection system,analyze the decision-making mechanism of food manufacturers,and optimize the food effort level,which enriched the research and theoretical basis in the field of food safety issues of the supply chain.