双重信息不对称下环境服务供应链激励机制研究

Research on Incentive Mechanism of Environmental Service Supply Chain under Double Information Asymmetry

为解决环境服务供应链中的信息不对称问题,本文基于委托代理理论,构建了当污染治理技术与努力程度均为第三方环境服务商信息的治污激励模型,设计了混同激励契约与分离激励契约,研究结果表明:(1)激励系数随消费者绿色意识与排污权交易价格上升而上升,随努力成本系数、产出效益的方差、第三方风险规避系数的增加而减小;(2)低治理能力的第三方环境服务商始终获得保留收益,而高治理能力的第三方环境服务商可以获得额外收益;(3)高治理能力的第三方环境服务商倾向于采用混同激励契约,排污企业更愿意采用分离激励契约;(4)高能力者占比的增加使得排污企业利润增加,排污权交易价格上升有助于第三方环境服务的推广,消费者绿色意识的增加能使双方利润都增加从而实现共赢。

In order to solve the problem of information asymmetry in the environmental service supply chain,based on the principal-agent theory,this paper constructs a pollution control incentive model when the pollution control technology and effort level are the information of third-party environmental service providers,and designs a mixed incentive contract and a separate incentive contract.The research results show that:(1)the incentive coefficient increases with the increase of consumers’green awareness and emission rights trading price,and decreases with the increase of the effort cost coefficient,the variance of output benefit,and the third-party risk aversion coefficient;(2)Third-party environmental service providers with low governance capabilities always obtain retained earnings,while third-party environmental service providers with high governance capabilities can obtain additional benefits;(3)Third-party environmental service providers with high governance capabilities tend to adopt mixed incentive contract,polluting enterprises are more willing to adopt the separate incentive contract;(4)The increase in the proportion of high-capacity environmental service providers will increase the profits of polluting enterprises,the increase in the transaction price of pollution rights will help the promotion of third-party environmental services,and the increase in consumers’green awareness can increase the profits of both parties and achieve a win-win situation.