摘要
随着分工协作的强化,制造业供应链上下游的企业管理越来越被关注,尤其是质量监管已经成为制造业企业不可忽视的环节。我国对食品质量的监管重视程度不断提高,也进行多次改革,但仍有许多方面需要加强。文章从原材料供应商和预制品制造商角度出发,考虑质量监管,通过建立供应链上下游企业双方演化博弈模型,结合制度工程学,构建了孙氏图和惩罚制度参数表,研究当前制度无效性的状况,探索使制度有效性的条件,并根据条件提出相对应的治理措施。
With the strengthening of division of labor and cooperation,enterprise management in the upstream and downstream of manufacturing supply chain has attracted more and more attention,especially quality supervision has become a link that can not be ignored by manufacturing enterprises.From the perspective of its raw material suppliers and product manufacturers,considering quality supervision,by establishing the evolutionary game model of upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain,combined with institutional engineering,this paper constructs the sun diagram and the parameter table of punishment system,studies the current situation of institutional ineffectiveness,explores the conditions for institutional effectiveness,and puts forward corresponding governance measures according to the conditions.
作者
徐成龙
张峥
XU Chenglong;ZHANG Zheng(University of Shanghai for Science and Technology,Shanghai 200093,China)
出处
《物流科技》
2022年第5期31-35,共5页
Logistics Sci-Tech
关键词
供应链
质量监管
演化博弈
制度工程学
supply chain
quality supervision
evolutionary game
institutional engineering