摘要
当代认识论中有两条关于证成的假设非常流行,它们常常被用来解释什么是证成。首先,一种信念是被证成的当且仅当它符合对信念进行认知评估的关键规范标准。其次,一个主体在日常场景和怀疑论场景下的信念是同样有证成的。然而,传统的证成与否的区别不足以解释这两种情景下的信念在认知规范上的差异。从认识论的问题退回到一般的规范性考虑,可以提出一种新的分析框架:在基本的规范之外,还有衍生的二级规范和三级规范。这三种规范之间互不等价。只有遵守基本规范才可以说成是有证成。在违反基本规范的情况下,即使遵守了二级和三级规范,最多只能说成是有良好的辩解或无可指责的。这个新的分析框架不仅可以解释日常场景和怀疑论场景中主体信念的规范差异,而且也能够解释为什么认识论学者普遍倾向于为怀疑论场景中的信念赋予证成,因为他们没有意识到在简单的有证成和没有证成之外,还存在“无可指责但无证成的”的信念类型。
Two hypotheses about justification are very prevalent in contemporary epistemology and are often used to explain what justification is.First,a belief is justified if and only if it meets the key normative standard for the epistemic assessment of beliefs.Second,the beliefs of a subject in everyday and skeptical scenarios are equally justified.However,the traditional distinction between justification and non-justification is not enough to explain the differences in epistemic norms between beliefs of the two scenarios.This essay steps back from the epistemological issues to general normative considerations,proposes a new framework:besides basic norms,there are derived secondary and tertiary norms.They are mutually non-equivalent.Only compliance with the basic norms can be said as "justified".In cases of a violation of the basic norms,even compliance with the secondary and tertiary norms,it can at best be said "excusable" or "blameless".This new framework can not only explain the difference of subject’ s belief’s in everyday and skeptical scenarios,but also can explain why epistemologists generally tend to attribute justification to beliefs in skeptical scenarios,because they are not aware that beyond a simple distinction between justification and non-justification,there is a type of belief which is " blameless without justification".
作者
徐召清
Timothy Williamson
出处
《湖北大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第3期71-80,F0003,共11页
Journal of Hubei University(Philosophy and Social Science)
基金
四川大学高水平国际化课程项目“认识论专题”(GSGJHKC2021009)资助。