康德法权与伦理学说关系的两种解读及其内在困境——兼论一种先验观念论视角的解决方式

Two Interpretations of the Relationship between Kant’s Doctrines ofRight and Virtue and the Corresponding Dilemma:And a Solution Derived from Transcendental Idealism

关于康德法权学说与伦理学说的关系,学界主要有分离论和直接推导论两种解读方式。分离论者通常着眼于诸义务、法则、强制方式等具体内容而忽略了两个体系的根据之关联;直接推导论者又往往将两个体系的根据归于一个未经界定与区分的自由概念,从而模糊了二者的差异。为走出上述两种解读方式的困境,可以遵循康德的先验观念论将作为根据的自由概念的作用方式分别界定为时空限制的和无时空限制的。根据实践理性普遍化的要求,两者各自在不同层面有着自己的实践法则,形成了法权与伦理两个领域。康德式的法权与伦理据此拥有一种间接的、通过自由的两种作用方式转换的关联,而这一转换的中介正是作为限制条件的时间与空间。

There are two interpretations of the relationship between Kant’s doctrines of right and virtue in the recent literature:the separation reading and the direct inference reading.Advocators of the former interpretation usually focus on the specific contents of duties,laws,and ways of coercion while not taking a closer look at the basis of the two doctrines;advocators of the latter often attribute the basis of the two systems to a concept of freedom that is not distinctly determinated and differentiated,thus confusing the scopes of those two systems.In order to get out of the dilemma,we should follow Kant’s transcendental idealism to define the functioning of the concept of freedom as spatially and temporally limited and as having no spatial or temporal limitation.In accordance with the requirement of practical reason,the two modes of functioning possess their own laws in terms of which respective boundaries of right and ethics are thus defined.The relation between Kantian right and ethics can therefore be seen as having an indirect connection through the transformation of the two modes of functioning of freedom,with space and time as its medium.