专利“繁荣”之谜:反向工程还是模仿创新?——基于三阶段博弈视角

Patent Boom Paradox:Reverse Engineering or Imitative Innovation?——From the Perspective of Three-Stage Game Theory

针对专利“繁荣”之谜,从产量决策、诉讼决策与专利决策3个阶段,剖析专利保护对技术创新和社会福利的影响。结果发现:(1)保护强度较小时,提高保护强度促使反向工程成功概率较低的跟随企业实施反向工程,倒逼领导企业申请专利;保护强度处于0.71以上时,无论跟随企业的专利策略如何,领导企业即便专利高度非常低也申请专利,导致技术生产陷入低水平的模仿创新。(2)保护强度对社会福利的影响不确定。跟随企业与领导企业的专利高度相近时,模仿创新机制有利于最大化社会福利,领导企业选择申请专利的临界值与保护强度呈U型。(3)跟随企业研发能力与反向工程成功概率均较大时,提高保护强度有利于技术生产由反向工程主导向模仿创新主导演进。

Aimming at patent boom paradox,this paper analyzes the effects of patent protection on technological innovation and social welfare from three-stage decision-making of production,litigation and patent application.Results show that,firstly,When the intensity of protection is lower,increasing patent protection encourages the following companies that have a low probability of success in reverse engineering to implement reverse engineering,and forces the leading companies to apply for patents.When the protection intensity is above 0.71,no matter what the patent strategy of the following company is,the leader will apply for patent even if its patent height is very low,which results in the low level of imitative innovation in technical production.Secondly,the impact of patent protection intensity on social welfare is uncertain.The imitative innovation mechanism is favorable to maximize social welfare when the patent height of the following enterprise is close to the leader’s,and there is a U-shaped relationship between the intensity of patent protection and the threshold of the patent application for the leader.Thirdly,increasing the patent protection intensity is beneficial to the evolution of technology production from reverse engineering to imitative innovation when the following company’s R&D capability and the probability of success in reverse engineering are both larger.