政府研发补贴、国家审计和企业创新——基于中央企业控股上市公司的实证研究

Government R&D Subsidies, National Audit and Enterprises Innovation: An Empirical Study on Listed Companies Controlled by Central Enterprises

以国家审计为切入点,选取2007—2016年中央企业控股上市公司为研究对象,基于审计署公布的审计公告这一事件构造准自然实验环境,采用多时点倍分法探讨国家审计对研发补贴政策激励效应的影响。研究发现,政府的研发补贴政策能显著促进企业研发投入,国家审计强化了政府研发补贴对企业研发投入的促进作用;并且,国家审计是通过监督作用和激励作用两种渠道改善研发补贴政策激励效应的。研究结论从外部监督和激励视角为理解国有企业研发补贴低效率之谜提供新的解释,为建立和健全我国国家审计制度提供参考。

This paper takes the national audit as the starting point, selects listed companies controlled by the central government from 2007 to 2016 as research objects, builds a quasi-natural experimental environment based on the audit announcement released by the National Audit Office, and uses the difference in differences(DID) method to explore the impact of state audit on the incentive effect of R&D subsidy policy. It is found that R&D subsidies can significantly promote firms’ R&D investment, and national audit strengthens the promoting effect of R&D subsidies on firms’ R&D investment. Moreover, national audit improves the effect of R&D subsidy policy through two channels: supervision and incentive effect. The conclusion provides a new explanation for understanding the riddle of "inefficiency" of SOE R&D subsidy from the perspective of external supervision and incentive, and provides theoretical guidance and practical inspiration for the establishment and improvement of China’s national audit system.